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ABSTRACT
This dissertation covers both policy-oriented and theory-based topics in International
Economics. The first two chapters cover financial policy related to the capital account,
while the third chapter covers tariff policy related to the current account.
The first chapter examines the theoretical value of capital controls in reducing the
probability of bank runs. I develop a global game model with information-based bank
runs and strategic complementarities within and between foreign and domestic creditors.
My analysis appears to be the first to model the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic
creditor behavior. The framework pins down the probability of a bank run and shows that
a capital control can lower the probability of a domestic bank run and of capital flight. I
also find that a control on outflows is relatively more effective than a control on inflows.
Finally, I test the model’s implications using the abnormal returns of Brazilian and South
Korean bank stock prices as a proxy for the probability of bank runs.
The second chapter analyzes the policy actions of Brazil and Chile from 2009 to 2011,
when Brazil deployed capital account regulations and Chile intervened in its currency
markets. I examine the effectiveness of each of these actions and the extent to which the
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actions of Brazil caused capital flow spillovers in the Chilean market. Consistent with the
peer-reviewed literature on the subject, I find that capital account regulations had small
but significant effects on shifting the composition of capital inflows toward longer-term
investment, on the level and volatility of the exchange rate, on asset price bubbles, and
on the ability of Brazil to have independence in monetary policy. Brazil’s regulations did
also temporarily cause an increase in capital flows into Chile. Chile’s interventions did not
have a lasting impact on the Chilean exchange rate or on asset prices beyond the initial
announcements of the policies. In Brazil’s case I thus conclude that Brazil’s regulations
helped the nation ‘lean against the wind,’ but were not enough to tame the ‘tsunami’ of
post-crisis capital inflows.
The third chapter uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to
late nineteenth century parameters to show that protectionism alleviated the skilled wage
gap. Had the U.S. chosen free trade instead of protective tariffs, wage inequality generally
would have been higher in the post-bellum era. The imposition of high tariffs after the Civil
War may have dampened what some economic historians believe to have been a long-term
upward trend in inequality—the rising portion of the American ‘Kuznets’ curve.
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1Chapter 1
Capital Controls and Bank Runs:
Theory and Evidence from Brazil
and South Korea
1.1 Introduction
After a period of capital market liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s, financial and cur-
rency crises erupted in emerging market economies (EMEs). More recently, capital flow
reversals occurred following the recent financial crises in the U.S. and Europe, again re-
viving the debate on the merits and costs of capital market openness. On the one hand,
open capital markets generate greater international risk sharing and promote growth by
reducing the cost of capital. On the other hand, international capital flows are highly
pro-cyclical and prone to reversals. Moreover, certain inflows such as short-term debt
flows do not generate efficient risk sharing but are instead destabilizing (Brunnermeier et
al., 2012). In effect, open capital markets may raise vulnerability to capital flight and
crises. Thus, prudential concerns related to perfect capital mobility have justified the use
of capital account regulation (capital controls) targeting the banking sector.
2This study focuses on one particular goal of capital controls—to lessen vulnerability
to financial crises by limiting capital inflows. My objective is to assess the prudential
role of capital controls using theory and bank-level data. The model rests on two main
contributions: a banking sector with both foreign and domestic domestic creditors, and
a theoretical framework for international policy analysis. I model a banking sector, since
most capital flows are channeled through banks (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Banks rely
on liquid liabilities and illiquid assets, so the model characterizes banks that rely on short-
term funding. Hence, banks are prone to runs. I assume an open banking sector, such that
banks hold deposits from both foreign and local creditors. If strategic complementarities
exist between foreign and local creditors, this model can show how capital openness in the
banking sector amplifies the likelihood of a crisis. If controls, by reducing bank deposits
by foreigners, lower the probability of bank runs, then controls may reduce financial crisis
vulnerabilities.
A global game model of the banking sector provides a useful framework to assess
the impact on bank run probability. I develop an information-based bank run model
following Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), which extends Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by
pinning down a unique bank run equilibrium. A unique equilibrium can quantify and
endogenize the likelihood of a crisis, allowing room for policy analysis. My model is a
banking sector that provides a risk sharing contract to risk averse agents. There are two
groups of agents—foreign and local creditors—who differ in their payoffs. While a local
creditor’s payoff is in terms of the local currency, a foreign creditor is paid in dollars and
subject to exchange rate risk. The model embodies a more complex tradeoff: the benefits
3of risk sharing versus the costs of bank runs and exchange rate risk.
An open economy framework is essential because it can examine two sources of financial
fragility–exchange rate risk and strategic complementarities between foreign and local
creditors. Strategic complementarities within and between the foreign and local creditors
imply that an increase in the probability of capital flight raises the probability of domestic
bank runs, and vice versa1. In other words, runs by foreign creditors make local creditors
more likely to run, and vice versa. This interaction can be exacerbated by capital-flight-
induced exchange rate depreciation.
A vicious cycle driven by the behavior between foreign and local creditors ensues as
follows. Runs by foreign creditors (capital flight) causes a depreciation in the exchange
rate which reduces the value of bank liabilities, inducing withdrawals by local creditors.
To service withdrawals, banks rely on the central bank’s foreign reserves. The reduction
in the stock of foreign reserves caused by capital outflows weakens the central bank’s
credibility in stabilizing the exchange rate, thereby again raising the likelihood of further
runs by foreign creditors.2 In the other direction, a surge in withdrawals by local creditors
signals that the local economy is weakening and the local currency may depreciate, thereby
inducing withdrawals by foreign creditors. Here, the main sources of bank runs are not only
maturity mismatches, but currency mismatches between foreign liabilities and domestic
assets, which expose foreign investors to exchange rate risk.
An important contribution of this study is the use of bank-level data to test my model’s
1I distinguish capital flight as runs by foreign creditors, and domestic bank runs as runs by local
creditors.
2Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) provide cross-country evidence that higher international reserves are
associated with a lower probability of future crises.
4implications. The empirical findings in this paper complement another paper, Baumann
and Gallagher (2012), which quantifies the impact of Brazilian controls on macroeconomic
variables, particularly net capital inflows. In this paper I test the impact of Brazilian and
South Korean controls in the post-crisis period on individual bank stock prices, which can
measure the level of bank confidence in the financial sector on a more microeconomic level.
Specific policies of interest include: the Brazilian IOF (foreign exchange transactions) tax
on inflows, reserve requirements on banks’ dollar positions in Brazil, and controls on banks’
foreign exchange holdings and other bank restrictions in South Korea. Using an event
study methodology I examine the responses of Brazilian and South Korean bank stock
prices to announcements of these prudential controls. For Brazil, I separate the analysis
into the post-crisis and the pre-crisis period: in the pre-crisis period, capital controls were
imposed, then lifted, and then re-imposed in the post-crisis period. I quantify the impact of
controls from the abnormal returns of OLS regressions of bank stock prices. Moreover, the
abnormal returns of stock prices act as a proxy for the probability of bank runs (Veronesi
and Zingales, 2010). However, it is unclear how banks should react to capital controls
since my model does not provide a direct link to equity value. Nonetheless, bank runs are
costly because they interrupt productive investment; a reduction in their likelihood would
add value to the banking sector in the form of increased asset prices. The prediction is
then that capital control announcements should increase bank stock prices.
My study confirms strategic complementarities exist between foreign and local creditors
and finds that capital controls can reduce the probability of domestic and foreign bank
runs. I conclude that a capital control that reduces bank inflows can help avert financial
5crises, yet a control on outflows may be more effective. To complement these theoretical
findings, I examine the impact of announcements of capital controls on Brazilian and South
Korean bank confidence. I find that capital controls on inflows had significant effects on
bank stock prices in both countries. Given by positive cumulative abnormal returns,
controls raised stock prices in most banks in the Brazilian sample, yet only for a minority
in the Korean sample. Thus, I conclude that capital controls improved confidence in the
Brazilian banking sector, confirming my model’s findings.
1.2 Background on Capital Controls and Financial Crises
Capital controls serve two main functions: acting as a policy response to excessive
macroeconomic activity, and as a prudential regulation. Capital controls are temporary,
and in serving as a policy response they aim to curb surges in inflows and exchange rate
appreciation. As a prudential regulation, they aim to prevent and mitigate capital flight
and crises, i.e. to prevent a currency devaluation or a bank run. These two functions can
be viewed as corrective measures by counteracting the procyclicality of short-term flows
which can be a negative externality to macroeconomic stability (Gallagher et al., 2012).
Why would this be necessary? A bias toward short-term debt has developed over time,
and high levels of short-term debt have been shown to precipitate crises (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009). Additionally, empirical evidence confirms that capital flow bonanzas usually
precede banking crises; for example, in their excellent survey of financial crises, Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) uncover that the probability of a banking crisis conditional on a capital
flow bonanza is greater than the unconditional probability. Thus, as “engines of financial
6distress”, capital flows pose a concern to macroeconomic stability (Brunnermeier et al.
2012, p. 2). Policy solutions point to prudential controls, such as reserve requirements on
foreign-currency-denominated liabilities and taxes on debt inflows and foreign exchange
derivatives. Thus, my goal is to identify a relationship between capital controls and bank
run probability.3
Another important prudential concern of capital market openness is the impact on
exchange rate risk. Exchange rate volatility heightens both the probability and the cost
of financial crises. A greater share of dollar-denominated investments on bank balance
sheets raises rollover and exchange rate risks, thereby raising the probability of capital
flight and banking crises. In fact, an extensive literature on ‘twin crises’ occurring since
the 1980s confirms that a currency crisis usually precedes a banking crisis, and financial
crises involving both are more costly than a banking or currency crisis alone (Bordo et
al.,2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Moreover, the most significant predictors of
banking and currency crises are leverage booms and real exchange rate appreciation for
both developed and emerging economies (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). Heavy capital
inflows undoubtedly contribute to both credit booms and currency appreciation. Taxing
debt inflows or limiting foreign-currency-denominated investments are policy examples
that would address vulnerabilities to both banking and currency crises.
Numerous EMEs have implemented prudential controls to limit debt inflows and reduce
currency mismatches. In the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, more than half of EMEs had
3I focus on bank runs since they are predictors of economic distress. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) shows
how runs are costly because they interrupt productive investment activity, while Bernanke (1983) asserts
that bank runs are better predictors of economic distress than money supply.
7controls on bond inflows as well as foreign exchange related measures, such as requirements
on foreign exchange deposit accounts (Qureshi et al., 2011). EMEs such as Malaysia,
Chile, and Croatia introduced prudential measures that were effective in reducing short-
term bank debt (Ostry et al., 2010). For example, in 1994 Malaysia introduced prudential
bank requirements, including asymmetric open-position limits, and temporary controls on
inflows, while Croatia imposed measures such as marginal reserve requirements on bank
foreign financing from 2004 to 2008. A large body of literature examines the effectiveness
of controls and finds that prudential measures most often alter the maturity composition
of inflows and reduce short-term inflows (Magud et al., 2011, Qureshi et al., 2011).
Brazil and Korea’s continued use of capital controls since the 2008 global financial crisis
makes for an excellent subject to study their efficacy. As indicated by sudden reversals in
net capital inflows in EMEs, the capital account is volatile and highly procyclical.4 The
resurgence of inflows beginning in 2009 spurred the use of capital controls in EMEs such
as Brazil and South Korea. Beginning in October 2009 and with subsequent hikes, Brazil
reimposed a foreign exchange transactions (IOF) tax on foreign purchases of bonds and
equities. In January 2011 the government enacted regulation more directly targeting banks,
imposing a unremunerated reserve requirement of 60 percent on short dollar-denominated
positions in local banks. During this post crisis period Brazil also taxed foreign loans and
extended the tax to higher maturities multiple times.
South Korea is relatively more proactive with policies targeting the banking sector.
4Sudden reversals occurred in 2008 and 2009 following the U.S. subprime crisis and in late 2011 following
the European debt crisis concerns; each episode resulted in rebounds of portfolio flows, calling for a need
for prudential regulation (Brunnermeier et al., 2012).
8Beginning in late 2009 the country levied controls on banks’ foreign exchange holdings
of derivatives, forwards, and liabilities. The main objective of the policies is to curb
short-term foreign debt and tighten foreign exchange liquidity, both which contribute to
capital flow and exchange rate volatility. The first policy implemented in November 2009
required banks to hold a designated amount of high-rated foreign treasury bonds and to
reduce trading in forex futures. In 2010 the government lowered limits on foreign exchange
derivative holdings in banks, with stricter limits for foreign-owned banks than domestic
banks. In the same year subsequent policies included barring banks’ foreign currency loans
to local companies for domestic use. The most recent policies implemented in 2011 were
a levy on banks’ non-deposit foreign exchange borrowings, with higher levies for short-
term debt, and an additional reduction in the limit on banks’ foreign exchange derivatives
holdings. It is worthwhile to determine whether or not the policy goals are met, i.e.
whether or not capital controls are an effective prudential tool to avert future financial
crises.
1.3 Related Literature
To the best of my knowledge, only a handful of studies have modeled capital market
openness and financial crises. The few theoretical studies modeling a limit on inflows show
how the policy’s main purpose is a prudential one–to correct market failures and reduce
systemic risk in an environment with excessive risk-taking and leveraging. Aizenman
(2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Korinek (2011) are studies that model capital flows
as sources of negative externalities, showing how they create a wedge between private and
9social marginal benefits. These models assert that the optimal policy is a capital control
that corrects the wedge and restores efficiency.
In contrast to the above studies, my model explicitly relates inflows of foreign capital
to the probability of a bank run. Like Aizenman (2010) I explicitly model the banking
sector but one that is prone to runs by creditors. I follow global game model of Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005) and model a representative bank that offers a risk-sharing contract
and is subject to liquidity shocks. The global game approach is useful: the model pins
down a unique threshold equilibrium in order to assess the probability of a bank run. In
my model, however, there are two types of creditors, foreign and local. The types differ in
their payoffs; local creditors obtain their payment in the local currency, while foreigners
obtain in the foreign currency (dollars). Thus, both liquidity risk and exchange rate risk
impact the behavior of creditors.
In addition to these frictions, this model exhibits strategic complementarities between
local and foreign creditors. As in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) a creditor’s incentive to
run depends on the macroeconomic fundamentals and other creditors’ behavior, i.e. runs
are information-based. Yet in an open economy banking sector with foreign creditors, the
incentive to run depends also on the behavior of the other creditor type. Strategic comple-
mentarities between creditors create a vicious circle, similar to that of Goldstein (2005).
This study, in the global game approach, models strategic complementarities between for-
eign creditors and speculators in the banking sector and currency market. I model only the
banking sector and thus focus only on the behavior of creditors. While Goldstein (2005)
assumes creditors are risk neutral and lacks the risk-sharing benefit offered by the bank,
10
creditors in my model are risk-averse and deposit in a bank that enables risk-sharing. Also
unlike Goldstein (2005), with positive probability the bank can become bankrupt given a
sufficiently high level of early withdrawals.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Baseline Framework
I now present a model of strategic complementarities within and between foreign and local
creditors. The global games methodology with imperfect information allows us to derive a
unique equilibrium and, therefore, assess empirical implications. I first describe the model
under the assumption of common knowledge of the fundamentals of the economy.
The economy consists of one open banking sector with two types of agents, local cred-
itors and foreign creditors, which is common knowledge. The analysis of two agent types
allows for an analysis of strategic complementarities between foreign and local creditors
in an emerging market bank sector. By assumption the banking sector and local credi-
tors are located in an emerging market economy, while the foreign creditors are located
in a developed economy. All local and foreign creditors are risk-averse and each have a
utility function u(c), which is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, satisfies
u(0) = 0, and for any consumption c has a relative risk-aversion coefficient, −cu′′(c)/u′(c),
greater than 1, as assumed also in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).5
There are three time periods, t=0, 1, and 2. At t=0, a continuum [0,1] of local creditors
5The assumption of risk aversion contrasts Goldstein (2005) which assumes risk neutral creditors.
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each hold a claim of one unit in local currency in a commercial bank, while a continuum
[0,f ] of foreign creditors each hold a claim of one unit in local currency in the same bank.
Here, f denotes the relative mass of foreign agents to local agents: given a mass F of
foreign creditors and a mass D of local creditors, then f = F/D. The level of inflows d is
determined by the share of foreign creditors who decide to deposit in the bank. Foreign
deposits are first taken as given, i.e. d = 1, so I assume that the entire mass of foreign
creditors deposit in the bank. I later endogenize this variable.
Why do foreign creditors exist? Besides the benefit of international risk sharing, foreign
creditors invest in the bank to reap a higher rate of return, relative to their domestic bank,
and increasing returns on aggregate investment.6 These creditors also have incentive to
invest in order to profit from an appreciating exchange rate since they are paid back in
dollars. The key difference between foreign and local creditors is the currency denomination
of their payoffs.
Both types of the risk-averse agents make investment decisions to maximize their ex-
pected payoffs. Specifically, each foreign and each local agent decides whether to withdraw
his deposit in period t=1 or wait until the following period, t=2. A fraction δ of the foreign
creditors are impatient and withdraw in t=1, while a fraction λ (= δ) of the local creditors
are impatient and withdraw in t=1. The fraction of early withdrawals is not observable
to the bank, but is private information to the creditors. The exchange rate is initially at a
level of 1 in t=0 and t=1, but can fluctuate in t=2, depending on the level of withdrawals.
If a substantial number of foreign investors withdraw from the bank, then the surge in
6In this study I do not assume the latter, but the framework nevertheless allows for increasing returns
to be modeled.
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demand for their foreign currency causes the local exchange rate to depreciate in t=2.
The bank offers a demand-deposit contract: creditors deposit their endowment in t=0,
and the bank invests all deposits in a local long-term asset. The investment yields a
long-term return R2(θ) after maturity in t=2, where θ represents the macro-fundamentals
of the economy and is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. The long-term return
is increasing in θ. 7 Upon early withdrawal by a creditor in t=1, the bank promises a
fixed payment, R1. If the creditor waits and withdraws in the long-term (t=2), he obtains
the return R2(θ). Additionally, I assume the short-term return from foreign deposits is
obtained in local currency.
To service agents in the short-term, the bank must liquidate some of the investment.
To service the foreign agents, the bank must exchange the local currency for dollars with
the central bank in order to pay back these agents in dollars. Thus, the central bank
must convert the short-term return from the local currency to dollars, in effect reducing
its foreign reserves.
As noted earlier, the returns to local creditors and foreign creditors differ. The ex-post
payoffs in both periods for both creditor groups are given in the following tables:
Figure A.1. Ex-Post Payments to Local Creditors
7I do not assume increasing returns in order to simplify the analysis. Once can additionally assume that
the return is decreasing in n and m in order to embody increasing returns to scale on pooled aggregate
investment.
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Period of Withdrawal mdf + n < (df + 1)/R1 mdf + n ≥ (df + 1)/R1
t=1 R1 R1 with probability
df+1
(mdf+n)R1
0 otherwise
t=2 df+1−(mdf+n)R1df+1−(mdf+n) ·R2(θ) 0
For the local creditors, the long-term payoff depends on the state of the economy (θ),
the level of local withdrawals (m), the level of foreign withdrawals (n), and, as I will show
later, the level on foreign deposits (d). The long-term return R2(θ) is increasing in the
macroeconomic fundamentals, θ, since the long-term asset is local. Increasing returns is
also a realistic characteristic of open emerging market economies; capital inflows yield high
returns and benefit markets in their early stages of development (Henry, 2007; Goldstein,
2005).
Since the foreign agents are investing in a foreign market, their payoffs depend not
only on market fundamentals and withdrawals, but the exchange rate as well. Their long-
term payoff depends also on the exchange rate (e2) since they must be paid back in dollars
and thus are subject to exchange rate risk. Payments to foreign creditors are shown below.
Figure A.2. Ex-Post Payments to Foreign Creditors
Period of Withdrawal mdf + n < (df + 1)/R1 mdf + n ≥ (df + 1)/R1
t=1 R1 R1 with probability
df+1
(mdf+n)R1
0 otherwise
t=2 df+1−(mdf+n)R1df+1−(mdf+n) ·R2(θ) · e2(θ,mdf, n) 0
For simplicity, I assume the exchange rate in t=1 remains at its initial level of 1, hence
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e1 = 1. However, the exchange rate in t=2 depends on θ as well as the level of inflows and
of withdrawals. Then, the exchange rate is endogenous such that e2 = e(θ,m, df, n), with
eθ > 0, emdf < 0,, and en < 0. Given my normalization, total deposits in the bank are
df + 1, where total foreign deposits in the emerging market bank are df and the total local
deposits are 1. Total early withdrawals in t=1 by the foreigners are m times df , while
total early withdrawals by local creditors are n.
The bank offers an optimal (first-best) contract enabling risk-sharing; thus, R1 > 1.
8
Thus in this model the benefit to both foreign and local creditors in this bank contract
comes from both (international) risk-sharing. The bank also follows a sequential service
constraint by paying out R1 in t=1 until it runs out of resources. In this case there is some
positive probability that the creditor receives 0 if he withdraws early in period t=1.9
Assuming free entry such that banks make zero profits, banks offer the same contract
that maximizes agents’ welfare. Hence, I simplify to a single bank to represent the overall
banking sector. Given our assumptions, this problem yields two equilibria: one equilibrium
yields the first-best allocation, while the other entails a bank run. In the former, the banks
offers R1 > 1 ; as long as Eθ[u(
df+1−(δdf+λ)R1
df+1−(δdf+λ) ·R2(θ))] > u(R1) and Eθ[u(df+1−(δdf+λ)R1df+1−(δdf+λ) ·
R2(θ) · e2(θ, δdf, λ))] > u(R1) for local and foreign creditors, respectively, then only the
proportion λ of local creditors and the proportion δ of foreign creditors will withdraw early,
8When the proportions δ and λ are observable, a social planner sets a short-term payment c1 of
agents who run so as to maximize local creditors’ ex ante expected utility, ((δdf + λ)c1 + (1 − (δdf +
λ))u( df+1−(δdf+λ)c1
df+1−(δdf+λ) R2(θ)). This yields the following first-order condition gives the first-best allocation:
u′(c1) = Eθ[R2(θ)] · u′( df+1−(δdf+λ)c1df+1−(δdf+λ) Eθ[R2(θ)]). Since creditors are risk-averse, the first-best payment
must be c1 > 1. The same result holds for foreign creditors. Thus, when the proportions δ and λ are
not observable, the bank cannot offer payments contingent on their type, but can enable risk-sharing by
offering a contract with a short-term payment greater than one.
9The payoff structure differs to that of Goldstein (2005), which rules out the possibility of bankrupcy
and uses arbitrary non-zero payoffs in each period.
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i.e. there are no runs, and n = λ and m = δ. However, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
the second equilibrium is one in which all creditors run, i.e. n = 1 and m = 1. These
creditors receive the payoffs listed in the right-hand scenario of Figures A.1 and A.2.
Since I are interested in analyzing a unique equilibrium in order to assess policy im-
plications, I use the technique of the global games literature to overcome multiplicity of
equilibria. Thus, I assume that the realization of the state θ in t=1 is not common knowl-
edge. Instead, creditors receives private signals of the state of the economy. The next
section explains the structure of private information.
1.4.2 Imperfect Information
Each type of creditor (foreign and local) receives a signal of the fundamentals of the state
of the economy, which determines whether or not they run on the bank or not. Their
decisions depend on the true fundamentals of the economy, θ, and on the behavior of other
agents. Moreover, the decision to withdraw early is both fundamental-based and panic-
based; runs are information-based. In particular, the local creditors and foreign creditors
receive a signal about the state of the economy or banking sector, θ, which has the improper
uniform prior over the closed interval [0, 1]. Agents have imperfect information of the true
state and act simultaneously. Signals force creditors to coordinate on their actions, so
that in one range of fundamentals θ they select the ’no run’ equilibrium, while in the
other range they select the ’run’ equilibrium. The state of fundamentals θ can represent
the level of productivity, monetary easing, or overall investor confidence in the emerging
16
market economy.
After the true state is realized in the beginning period t=1, its value is not publicly
revealed, but each agent receives his individual signal. Each agent i receives a signal
θi = θ + εi, where the noise term εi is independently distributed according to a smooth
symmetric uniform density function g(·) with the cumulative distribution function, G(·),
that is mean zero. The distribution of signals of foreign creditors is bounded by [−εf , εf ],
while that of local creditors is bounded by [−εl, εl]. The distributions differ to allow for
differing levels of precision.
The order of events of the agents’ behavior is described in the figure below.
Local and foreign
creditors hold
claims in bank.
t = 0
Value of funda-
mentals is real-
ized.
t = 1
Creditors observe
signals, then ei-
ther run or do
not run.
Exchange rate
adjusts. Credi-
tors who did not
run obtain long-
term return.
t = 2
Figure A.3. Timeline
All local creditors use the same threshold strategies, as do all foreign creditors. All
local creditors run in t=1 if they receive a signal θi < θL. Otherwise, they do not run, but
wait until the next period (t=2) to obtain the expected long-term return. Hence, θL is a
threshold value determining whether a local creditor runs or waits. Similarly, all foreign
creditors run if they receive a signal θi < θF . Otherwise, they do not run. Hence, θF is
a threshold value specific to foreign creditors. The signal affects creditors’ behavior and
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incentive to run in several ways: a higher signal increases the posterior probability that
the creditor attributes to obtaining the long-term return R2(θ) and not 0, a higher signal
increases the expected realized value of R2(θ), and a higher signal makes the creditor
believe that other agents also have high signals. With these cases, a higher signal lowers
the creditor’s incentive to run; actions depend on signals.
I assume regions of extremely good and extremely bad fundamentals where agents’
actions are independent of other agents’ actions, i.e. where agents’ actions are known.
The existence of such upper and lower dominance regions allows for equilibrium selection
and is a condition for uniqueness (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Morris and Shin, 2003).
I describe the dominance regions for local creditors; analysis of the regions for foreign
creditors is analogous. the lower dominance region, the fundamentals are extremely bad
such that θ is very low and the net payoff of waiting until period 2 is negative even if all
patient agents wait. An agent’s best action is then to run regardless of his belief of other
agents’ actions. Denote θ as the value of θ for which u(df+1−(δdf+λ)R1df+1−(δdf+λ) · R2(θ)) = u(R1).
The interval [0, θ] refers to the lower dominance region. A local creditor runs if his signal
θi < θ − l since the difference between the creditor’s signal and the true state is no more
than l. Similarly, I denote the interval [θ, 1] as the upper dominance region. In this region
the fundamentals are extremely high: the long-term return exceeds the short-term return
and is obtained with certainty such that no agent runs regardless of his belief of other
agents’ actions. Hence, a creditor never runs if his signal θi > θ + l. Moreover, I assume
θ < 1−2l. An interpretation of the upper dominance region is the existence of an external
agent, such as a governmental institution or a large private agent, that is willing to pay
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the bank’s liabilities given a state of extremely good fundamentals.
Given that these extreme regions are small and unlikely, they generate an intermediate
region of θ where behavior is less known and beliefs are not arbitrary. In this intermediate
range agents observe noisy signals and take in account the equilibrium actions of other
agents’ nearby signals. These actions depend on actions at further signals, and so on. I
have now characterized the information structure on equilibrium strategies and beliefs.
I now describe utility differentials for local and foreign creditors, V L and V F , respec-
tively, as functions of the level of withdrawals. Below, I plot V L as a function of n and
V F as a function of m. Given a proportion (m) of foreign withdrawals, V L gives the
net payoff to a local creditor of withdrawing in period 2 for different proportions (n) of
local withdrawals. Similarly, given a proportion (n) of local withdrawals, V F gives the
net payoff to a foreign creditor of withdrawing in period 2 for different proportions (m) of
foreign withdrawals.
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Figure A.4. Net Payoff to Local/Foreign Creditors of Withdrawing in Period 2 versus Period 1
(Exogenous exchange rate, e2 = 1)
The figure above depicts the net payoffs to creditors10. I assume the following pa-
rameter values: εl = εf = 0.1, d = 1, f = 1, δ = λ = 0.1, and e = 1. Hence the net
payoffs assume equal signal imprecision among foreign and local creditors, equal masses
of foreigners and locals, equal shares of impatient foreigners and locals, and an exchange
rate that stays constant. In this case foreign and local creditors are identical and have the
same net utility in Figure 2. When the exchange rate appreciates (depreciates), foreigners’
net utility simply shifts up (down). I now turn to the model’s main source of financial
friction: strategic complementarities.
1.4.3 Strategic Complementarities
The model aims to examine the strategic complementaries within and between the two
types of agents–foreign and local creditors. In particular, the expected payoffs of each
creditor are adversely affected by the level of withdrawals, e.g. runs. Complementarities
exist within creditors since more early withdrawals by local (foreign) creditors–a higher n
(m)–reduces the long-term payoff of a local (foreign) creditor. Complementarities between
local and foreign creditors also exist: a higher n reduces the long-term payoff of foreign
creditors, and vice versa. Strategic complementarities is a source of financial fragility in
this model because self-fulfilling beliefs can drive the behavior of creditors and amplify
10Payoffs are specified in CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility, e.g. u = 1 − e−σc, with risk
aversion coefficient σ = 1.001 > 1 to guarantee optimal risk sharing.
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crises.
Strategic complementarities within each type are described as follows. In the emerging
market bank, each local creditor agent has a greater incentive to withdraw early when
more local creditors withdraw early. A substantial number of early withdrawals cause the
bank to liquidate its investment, thereby lowering the expected long-term return. Each
foreign creditor behaves similarly and has greater incentive to run when more foreigners
run, but with the added concern of exchange rate depreciation.
Strategic complementarities between the local and foreign agents also exist. In the
emerging market banking sector, the mismatch between foreign liabilities and local assets
increases the likelihood that the bank cannot service withdrawals in the event of an ex-
change rate devaluation. A high level of foreign withdrawals (outflows m) increases the
relative demand of the foreign currency, thereby reducing the central bank’s foreign ex-
change reserves. The central bank then loses credibility in stabilizing the exchange rate,
leading to an exchange rate devaluation. This lowers the value of the bank’s investments,
inducing local creditors to run in fear of the bank running out of funds and unable to
service its debt. Similarly, the incentive for foreign creditors to run increases with the
number of local creditors who run, as their behavior signals that emerging market bank-
ing conditions are poor and that the exchange rate may depreciate due to poor economic
environment or that the bank may become insolvent.11
11The distinction between illiquid and insolvent is important. Illiquid pertains to a bank being tem-
porarily unable to roll-over in the short-term, but willing and able to service in the long-term. Insolvent
pertains to a bank being unwilling or unable to service debts in the long-term (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010).
I focus on insolvency in this model since insolvency is a significant factor in recent crises. Also, I allow for
the event of bankrupcy, where the bank becomes insolvent and unable to pay off in the long-term and only
partially service agents in the short-term. The possibility of insolvency drives behavior in this model.
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In this study I study both between- and within-agent-group strategic complementari-
ties, but with emphasis on between-type complementarities. I identify between-type com-
plementarities by defining equations characterizing two threshold functions, θF (θL) and
θL(θF ). Foreign creditors have the same threshold strategy: they run if they observe a
signal below θF and wait until the long-term if they observe a signal above θF . Given
the strategies of foreign creditors, local creditors coordinate on a threshold strategy: they
run if they observe a signal below θL and wait until the long-term if they observe a signal
aboveθL.
As shown in Figure 2, the model does not exhibit global strategic complementarities–
agents’ incentive to run increases with the number of other agents who run. V F and
V L are not decreasing in m and n, respectively, for the entire range of values. Global
complementarities require the total net payoff to be increasing in m and in n. Hence,
there are partial strategic complementarities.
1.4.4 Equilibrium Threshold Strategies
I now derive threshold functions: θL(θF ) and θF (θL). Take θL(θF ), the threshold strategy
of the local creditors for each threshold strategy of the foreign creditors. Consider a local
creditor that observes θL and believes that foreign creditors play a threshold strategy
characterized by θF . Due to continuity this creditor is indifferent between running and
not running on the emerging market bank. Given the creditor’s observation of this signal,
the expected payoff of running is equated to the expected payoff of waiting. Thus,
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θi+εl∫
θi−εl
(V L(θ,m, n, d, f))g(θL − θ)dθ = 0 (1.1)
Similarly, the equation that determines the threshold function θF (θL)–the threshold
strategy of foreign creditors for each threshold strategy of the local creditors–is given
below.
θi+εf∫
θi−εf
(V F (θ,m, n, d, f))g(θF − θ)dθ = 0 (1.2)
The utility differentials, V L(θ,m, n, d, f) and V F (θ,m, n, d, f), are summarized below.
Moreover, these net utilities between waiting and running are specified for circumstances
of bank solvency and insolvency.
V L(θ,m, n, d, f) =

u(
df+1−(mdf+n)R1
df+1−(mdf+n) ·R2(θ))− u(R1) if (df + 1)/R1 ≥ mdf + n ≥ δdf + λ
0− df+1
(mdf+n)·R1 · u(R1) if (df + 1)/R1 ≤ mdf + n ≤ 1 + df
V F (θ,m, n, d, f, e) =

u(
df+1−(mdf+n)R1
df+1−(mdf+n) ·R2(θ) · e2(θ,mdf, n))− u(R1) if (df + 1)/R1 ≥ mdf + n ≥ δdf + λ
0− df+1
(mdf+n)·R1 · u(R1) if (df + 1)/R1 ≤ mdf + n ≤ 1 + df
The utility differentials confirm that the model exhibits partial strategic complemen-
tarities within each group of creditors. The top term for each type of creditor denotes
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the net payoff of waiting when the bank does not become bankrupt. In this state, the
creditor’s incentive to run increases if more creditors run since less of the bank’s assets
is remaining in t=2. The bottom term denotes the net payoff of waiting when the bank
becomes bankrupt. In this state, the creditor’s incentive to run decreases when more
creditors run since the payments remaining in t=1 decreases with the number of early
withdrawals, while the payment in t=2 remains null.
Upon changing the variable of integration, equation 1 can implicitly characterize the
function θL(θF ). The equations below more explicitly account for the regions of solvency
and insolvency in terms of n and m, as shown above. Noting that, conditional on the signal
θL, the posterior density over θ is given by g(θL−θ), which is constant and equal to 1/2εl.
Conditional on the signal θF , the posterior density over θ is given by g(θF − θ), which is
equal to 1/2εf . Given the state θ, the share of local creditors who run (n) is G(θL − θ),
or θL−θ+εl2εl . The share of foreign creditors who run (m) is G(θF − θ), or
θF−θ+εf
2εf
.
n2∫
n=λ
(u(
df + 1− (G[θF − θL +G−1(n)]df + n)R1
df + 1− (G[θF − θL +G−1(n)]df + n) R2(θL −G
−1(n)))− u(R1))dn
+
1∫
n2
(0− df + 1
(G[θF − θL +G−1(n)]df + n) ·R1 · u(R1))dn = 0 (1.3)
where n2 = (df+1)/R1−[(θF−θL)df ]/2εl1+df , which designates the bound of runs n for which
the bank is either able or unable to service withdrawals.
Using the same manipulations, I rewrite equation 2 to implicitly characterize the func-
tion θF (θL) in the following equation:
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m2∫
m=δ
(u(
df + 1− (mdf +G[θL − θF +G−1(m)])R1
df + 1− (mdf +G[θL − θF +G−1(m)]) ·R2(θF −G
−1(m))
·e2(θF −G−1(m),mdf,G[θL − θF +G−1(m)]))− u(R1))dm+
1∫
m2
(0− df + 1
(mdf +G[θL − θF +G−1(m)]) ·R1 · u(R1))dm = 0 (1.4)
where m2 =
(df+1)/R1−(θL−θF )/2εf
1+df , which gives the bound of m for which the bank is
either able or unable to service withdrawals.
The first term in each equation above denotes the payoffs when the bank remains
solvent, while the second term denotes the payoffs when the bank goes bankrupt in t=1.
These two regions, solvency and insolvency, depend on the level of withdrawals by foreign
and local creditors, m and n, respectively.
I must show that there exists a unique equilibrium for the foreign creditors’ problem
and for the local creditors’ problem. As in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), I focus on
threshold equilibria, e.g. θL and θF . Given a signal equal to this strategy, a creditor is
indifferent between withdrawing in period 2 and in period 1. Although I have partial,
and not global, strategic complementarities in this model, I can still prove uniqueness by
showing single-crossing of the total net payoffs. That is, V L and V F each cross V = 0 only
once. As Figure 2 shows, both V L (V F ) are not monotonically decreasing in n (m), yet
both cross the x-axis at a unique point in the given range. Thus, Figure 2 confirms that
single-crossing is achieved, so there exists a unique threshold equilibrium each for foreign
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creditors and for local creditors.
One show show that for each θF that characterizes the behavior of foreign creditors,
there exists a unique θL characterizing the behavior of local creditors. When foreign
creditors play according to a threshold strategy θF , the share of foreign creditors who run
at each level of θ is G(θF − θ). Given θ and n, the net payoff to the local creditor who
does not run is u(df+1−(G(θF−θ)df+n)R1df+1−(G(θF−θ)df+n) ·R2(θ))− u(R1), if the bank does not go bankrupt
(insolvent) in t=1. Since the payoff is increasing in θ and decreasing in n, then local
creditors are less likely to run when the fundamentals are stronger and when fewer creditors
run. In the event of bankrupcy, the payoff to the local creditor is 0− df+1(G[θF−θ]df+n)·R1 ·u(R1),
which is decreasing in θ and increasing in n. If I assume no possibility of insolvency, the
creditors’ problem satisfies conditions for uniqueness, such as action monotonicity (the net
payoff is non-decreasing in θL), state monotonicity (the net payoff is non-decreasing in the
state θ).12 So for a given θF , there exists a unique θL that is a threshold strategy for
local creditors. Therefore, I can define a function θL(θF ) that determines the threshold
strategy played by local creditors for each threshold strategy played by foreign creditors.
The opposite case for the function θF (θL) is analogous.
1.4.5 Strategic Complementarities between Foreign and Local Creditors
Strategic complementarities identify a relationship between the the behavior of local cred-
itors and the behavior of foreign creditors: if foreign creditors believe that local creditors
are more prone to run on the bank (a higher θL), then more foreign creditors will run
12Please refer to Morris and Shin (1998, 2003) for the complete set of conditions.
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on the bank (hence, a higher θF ). The relationship is analogous for the beliefs of local
creditors. The following property gives further insight on the structure of strategic com-
plementarities between foreign and local creditors in this model.
Property 1: θF (θL) is increasing θL, and θL(θF ) is increasing in θF .
Proof
Analytically, global strategic complementarities may or may not exist and depend on
the magnitudes of the effects of perturbations in the threshold signals, θF and θL. There-
fore I prove the property of strategic complementarities numerically. I offer the analytical
explanation below in order to provide intuition for the numerical results.
The function θL(θF ) is implicitly characterized in equation 3. I must show that the
left hand side is increasing in θL and decreasing in θF . In the first net payoff term, I see
that R2(·) is increasing in θ and thus θL , and the coefficient term is increasing in θL and
decreasing in θF if the following condition holds: (R1 − 1)(df + 1) > 0. The condition
holds by assumption since both R1−1 > 0 and df + 1 > 0. Note that the integrand, n2, is
endogenous in θ, and hence my analysis requires the use of the Leibniz rule. The sign of
the derivative of this term is thus ambiguous due to the endogenous bound. The net payoff
in the second integral is decreasing in θF and increasing in θL. Thus, θL(θF ) is increasing
in θF if the derivatives of the first payoff term with respect to θF and θL are large enough
to offset the derivatives from the second term, which are of opposite sign. The existence
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of strategic complementarities between foreign and local creditors is ambiguous.
I conduct similar analysis for the function θF (θL) which is implicitly characterized in
equation 4. I must show that the left hand side of the equation is increasing in θF and
decreasing in θL. The additional term e2(·) which is increasing in θ and decreasing in m and
n provides an additional channel for strategic complementarities; hence, complementarities
may be more intense for foreigners than local creditors due to exchange rate risk. Again,
since R2(·) is also increasing in θ, e2(.) is increasing in θF and decreasing in θLand R2(·)
are increasing in θF . It remains to show that coefficient on these terms is increasing in
θF and decreasing in θL. The coefficient is increasing in θF and decreasing in θL if the
same condition holds: (R1 − 1)(df + 1) > 0. In evaluating the entire integral, I find
that the derivative with respect to θF may or may not be positive due to the endogenous
bound, m2, and the second integral. In evaluating the entire net payoff (both integrals),
it remains ambiguous whether the total payoff is increasing in θF and decreasing in θL.
As before, θF (θL) is increasing in θL if the positive derivative with respect to θF and
θL in the first integral is large enough to offset the derivative of the second integral,
which is of opposite sign. Thus, the findings are similar to those of θL(θF ). Strategic
complementarities between foreign and local creditors are therefore ambiguous. I cannot
use an analytical proof.
In order to confirm the existence of complementarities, I solve equations 3 and 4 nu-
merically for corresponding values of θF and θL. If ‘between’ complementarities exist,
then I expect each threshold signal to be increasing in the other, i.e. θ′F (θL) > 0 and
θ′F (θL) > 0. The following figure confirms global strategic complementarities between for-
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eign and local creditors when the exchange rate is constant at one, i.e. when foreign and
local creditors are identical.13 For the same assumption and parameters the subsequent
figure yields the Nash equilibrium of foreign and of local creditor strategies, (θ∗L, θ
∗
F ), given
by the intersection of θF (θL) and θL(θF ).
θL
θ F
θF(θL)
Figure A.5. Foreign Creditor Threshold Strategies
(df = 1, εl = εf = 0.1, R1 = 1.01,, σ = 1.001 and e2 = 1)
13When e2 = 1, the endogenous bounds, n2 and m2, both simplify to 1/R1.
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θL
θ F
θL(θF)
θF(θL)
(θ*L,θ*F)
Figure A.6. Foreign Creditor vs. Local Creditor Threshold Strategies
(df = 1, εl = εf = 0.1, R1 = 1.01,, σ = 1.001 and e2 = 1)
Figure 3A shows the threshold function θF (θL), which depicts how the threshold strat-
egy of foreigners responds to the threshold strategies of local creditors. Given the upward-
sloping relationship between θF and θL, this model exhibits global strategic complemen-
tarities between foreign and local creditors. Moreover, a higher θL, or a higher probability
of runs by local creditors, translates into a higher θF , or a higher probability of runs by
foreign creditors. A greater likelihood of domestic banks runs thus induces a greater like-
lihood of capital flight. In Figure 3B the intersection denotes the equilibrium threshold
strategies–the equilibrium probabilities of a domestic bank run and capital flight. With an
exogenous exchange rate, foreign and local creditors are identical agents so the equilibrium
values are equal, i.e. runs by foreign and by local creditors are equally likely.
The next two figures depict the equilibrium and structure of complementarities for in-
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creases in the short-term rate of return, R1, and for increases in the risk aversion coefficient,
σ.
θL
θ F
θL(θF)
θF(θL)
(θ*L,θ*F)
Figure A.7. Foreign Creditor vs. Local Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Increase in Short-Term Return, R1 = 1.02)
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θF(θL)
σ=1.25
θL(θF)
σ=1.25
θL(θF)
σ=1.001
θF(θL)
σ=1.001
Figure A.8. Foreign Creditor vs. Local Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Increase in Risk Aversion)
According to Figure A.7, the probability of runs by both creditors increases as the
short-term return increases, as expected. A higher return in period 1 lowers the net
incentive to wait, thereby raising the incentive to run. Although somewhat trivial, the
result confirms the findings of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005): a higher short-term return
enables greater risk-sharing, yet the cost of a bank run is higher since creditors are more
likely to run. Interestingly, the region where complementarities are weak, i.e. low values
where the curves are flatter, becomes larger while complementarities intensify for higher
values. Higher risk aversion yields similar effects: a higher absolute risk aversion coefficient,
σ, strengthens strategic complementarities, since the functions have steeper slopes, and
increases both bank run probabilities, as shown in Figure A.8.
I now characterize the equilibrium with exchange rate fluctuations. When the exchange
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rate e2 changes, foreign and local creditors are no longer identical.
14 Here, I do not yet
endogenize the exchange rate, but rather change the rate to a higher or lower fixed value.
The equilibrium for an exchange rate depreciation and appreciation is depicted below in
Figures 4A and 4B.
θL
		
θ F
θL(θF)
θF(θL)
(θ*L,θ*F)
Figure A.9. Foreign Creditor vs. Local Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Exchange Rate Depreciation, e2 = 0.98)
14Recall that the bounds must now be endogenous in θ. The modification, as will be shown, changes the
threshold functions from curved to nearly linear, strictly upward-sloping curves.
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θL
θ F
(θ*L,θ*F)
θL(θF)
θF(θL)
Figure A.10. Foreign Creditor vs. Local Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Exchange Rate Appreciation, e2 = 1.02)
An exchange rate depreciation adversely impacts the foreign creditor’s payoff, thereby
increasing a foreigner’s likelihood to run, as indicated by a higher θF . But due to strate-
gic complementarities, the likelihood of local creditors also increases, as indicated by a
higher θL. Table C below offers the values of these equilibrium probabilities. I scale the
equilibrium values such that each value denotes the probability of a domestic bank run
(θL) and the probability of capital flight (θF ). According the table, equilibrium values
of the threshold strategies both increase by almost 5 percent when the exchange rate de-
preciates, and the foreign creditor threshold increases by more. By contrast, when the
exchange rate appreciates, the equilibrium values both decrease, and the foreign creditor
threshold decreases by more. Thus, with an exchange rate depreciation, the probability of
capital flight is greater than the probability of domestic bank runs; with an appreciation,
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the probability of capital flight is relatively less.
Figure A.11. Impact of Exchange Rate Fluctuation on Bank Run Probabilities
e2 = 0.98 e2 = 1 e2 = 1.02
d f θL θF θF − θL θL θF θF − θL θL θF θF − θL
1 1 0.162 0.170 0.008 0.121 0.121 0 0.083 0.075 -0.008
Table C has important policy implications. When the exchange rate depreciates, runs
by foreigners are relatively more likely. Therefore, a control that impacts foreigners’ be-
havior may be optimal. Moreover, a control that reduces the probability of capital flight
is necessary when the exchange rate is depreciating or expected to depreciate.
1.4.6 Exchange Rate Risk
I more explicitly characterize exchange rate risk by endogenizing the exchange rate
such that e2 = e2(θ,mdf, n). Foreign creditor payoffs are now affected by an exchange
rate that varies with the state of the economy as well as creditor behavior. Moreover,
in order to capture an exchange rate increasing in θ and decreasing in mdf and n, I
assume the exchange rate moves according to the following equation: e2 = [(λ − m +
1)(1/df)]/[0.5 + (θL − θF )]. Figure 5A displays foreign creditor threshold strategies as
a function of local creditor strategies, i.e. the threshold function, θF (θL). When the
exchange rate is endogenous, θF (θL) is still strictly upward-sloping. However, the function
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is also strictly above the function when the exchange rate is fixed.15 For a given threshold
strategy of a local creditor, the foreign threshold is higher when the exchange rate is
more variant. Runs by foreigners are thus more likely if we model a flexible (endogenous)
exchange rate rather than assuming a fixed (exogenous) rate.
θL
θ F
e2=e(θ,mdf,n)
e2=1
θF(θL)
Figure A.12. Foreign Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Endogenous vs. Fixed Exchange Rate)
1.4.7 Risk Aversion
This model assumes a risk aversion coefficient that is greater than one. This constraint
on the level of risk aversion guarantees an optimal risk sharing contract and is the as-
sumption used in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). One
15Note that both functions assume an endogenous bound, m2, and thus lose the curvature of Figures
3A-D.
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interesting case then is a risk aversion coefficient less than or equal to one, e.g. 0 < σ ≤ 1.
With this modified assumption, agents are still risk-averse, but lose the benefit of risk
sharing. I recompute the model equilibrium and find that it in fact exists. I also find that
strategic complementarities exist between foreign and local creditors, but are weaker. In
other words, threshold strategies of local (foreign) creditors are increasing in the strate-
gies of foreign (local) creditors, but to a smaller degree. Figure A.13 below show how
the threshold function for foreigners, given an endogenous exchange rate, shifts down and
flattens when risk aversion decreases from a coefficient of 1.001 to 0.1. The next figure
gives the equilibrium for the same change in risk aversion given a constant exchange rate.
Both figures assume d = 1; Figure A.14, however, assumes simplified bounds, n2 and m2,
hence the curvature.
θL
θ F
σ=1.001
σ=0.1
Figure A.13. Foreign Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Endogenous Exchange Rate, σ = 1.001, 0.1)
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θL
θ F
σ=1.001
σ=0.1
Figure A.14. Foreign Creditor vs. Local Creditor Threshold Strategies
(e2 = 1, σ = 1.001, 0.1)
Another relevant case is the equilibrium with risk neutral creditors. The utility function
of agents is characterized by linear utility, or CRRA utility with a relative risk coefficient
equal to zero. I find that an equilibrium exists, and strategic complementarities exist
between foreign and local creditors. Compared to risk averse creditors, complementarities
are less intense for risk neutral creditors as one expects. Foreign creditor behavior is less
responsive to local creditor behavior, and vice versa, when creditors are risk neutral.
1.5 Policy
I now assess the impact of a capital control on banks’ vulnerability to financial crises
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using the probability of bank runs as a proxy. The specific capital control of interest is a
control on bank inflows. My model can capture this effect by setting a limit of deposits by
foreign creditors. I modify the baseline model by endogenizing the mass of foreign creditors.
Moreover, I include an additional strategy for the foreign creditors before period t=0, in
period t=-1. This change to the foreign creditor’s problem is depicted in the modified
timeline below.
Foreign creditors
holding dollars ob-
serve signals and
deposit or not in
bank.
t = −1
Foreign creditors
who deposited
and all local credi-
tors hold claims in
bank.
t = 0
Value of funda-
mentals is realized.
t = 1
Creditors observe
signals, then either
run or do not run.
Exchange rate ad-
justs. Creditors
who did not run
obtain long-term
return.
t = 2
Figure A.15. Timeline
There are now four periods, t=-1, 0, 1, and 2, and one commercial bank in the developed
economy in addition to the commercial bank in the emerging market economy. In t=-1,
a continuum [0,f ] of foreign creditors hold dollars and decide whether to deposit claims
in the emerging market banking sector, or stay in the developed economy and deposit in
developed economy bank. If a foreign creditor decides to deposit in the emerging market
bank, this agent holds a claim of one unit of local currency deposited in the bank and
obtains a long-term payoff of R2(θ) · e2(θ,mdf, n). Otherwise, the creditor deposits in the
developed economy bank. Recalling d as the proportion of foreign creditors who deposit
in the emerging market, then in t=0 a continuum [0,1] of local creditors hold claims in a
commercial bank as before, while a continuum [0,df ] of foreign creditors hold claims. After
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t=0, the foreign creditor then has same strategic problem as the local creditor: the choice
of withdrawing early (in t=1) or waiting until t=2.
Information on the state of the economy impacts foreign creditors’ decision to invest
or not in the emerging market. In addition to reaping a higher rate of return or an over-
valued exchange rate, foreign creditors have an additional factor impacting their incentive
to invest in the emerging market bank: poor economic fundamentals in the developed
economy relative to the emerging market. I assume the parameter ψ as the true state of
the developed economy relative to the emerging market.16 If the foreign creditor chooses
to deposit in the developed economy bank, he obtains a long-term payoff of r2(ψ). Under
common knowledge of the true state, there are multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium all
foreign creditors invest in the emerging market if the state is bad; hence, d = 1. In the
other equilibrium, all foreign creditors stay in their developed market if the state is good;
hence, d = 0.
I now formulate the problem assuming heterogeneity of foreign creditors in period t=-
1. Prior to their signal of the emerging market fundamentals in t=1, foreign agents receive
a signal in t=0 about the true state of their developed economy, ψ. Alternatively, one
can view this signal as a draw on their individual opportunity cost of investing abroad.
Specifically, each foreign agent receives a signal or draw, ψj = ψ + εj .
17 The noise term
quantifies the level of imprecision of the signals, or the level of heterogeneity of draws.
Thus, a foreign creditor’s opportunity cost, or signal, determines whether or not a creditor
16I assume ψ has the improper uniform prior over [0,1].
17The noise term εj is independently distributed according to a smooth symmetric density function h(·)
with cumulative distribution H(·) that is mean zero with support [−ε, ε].
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enters the emerging market, such that a low value would induce foreigners to invest in the
emerging market economy rather than stay domestic.
I now define equilibrium strategies of foreign creditors in period t=-1. Foreign agents
deposit in the bank if they receive a signal or have an opportunity cost ψj < ψF , where
ψF denotes the threshold, or cutoff, level. Otherwise, they invest in their native developed
economy bank. All foreign creditors have the same threshold strategy: they deposit in
the emerging market bank if they observe a signal below ψF and deposit in their local
bank when they observe a signal above ψF . Given the initial state ψ and a threshold
strategy ψF , the proportion of foreign investors d who invest in the emerging market bank
is H(ψF − ψ). Hence, the value of d denotes the level of inflows, or the proportion of
foreign creditors with low opportunity costs or low signals.
Actions and payoffs of foreign investors depend on not only the emerging market bank-
ing sector, but the developed banking sector as well. The overall return of the foreign
creditor is subject to a depreciation in the exchange rate, bank runs, as well as a capital
control, τ . The expected payoff P of the foreign investor is given by:
P =

E[R̂F ]− τ if invest abroad
E[r(ψ)] if invest locally
where R̂F is defined in equation 5 below.
The behavior of the foreign creditors in t=-1 is influenced by their expected behavior
in t=1. Given a creditor’s signal, that creditor is indifferent between investing and not
41
investing if the expected long-term payoff of investing abroad is equal to the expected
long-term payoff of investing in the developed economy. I assume the following condition
holds:
E[R̂F ]− τ = u(R1)
θj+∫
θj−
G(θF − θ)dθ +
+
θj+∫
θj−
(1−G(θF − θ))u(df + 1− (mdf + n)R1
df + 1− (mdf + n) R2(θ)e2(θ,mdf, n)dθ)− τ
≥
ψj+ε∫
ψj−ε
u(r2(ψ))h(ψF − ψ)dψ (1.5)
where G(θF − θ) denotes the likelihood that creditors run, and 1−G(θF − θ) denotes
the likelihood that creditors do not run.
The first term on the left hand side of the inequality is the expected payoff if the
creditor runs and gets R1, and the second term is the expected payoff if the creditors waits
and receives the long-term return.18 Given the signal ψF , the posterior density over ψ is
h(ψF − ψ). Equation (5) presents a condition determining the share of foreign creditors
who invest in the emerging market bank.
Before proceeding to the next section on the impact of policy, the structure of com-
plementarities is worth discussing. Although strategic complementarities exist within and
between foreign and local creditors in period t=1, both complementarities and substi-
tutability within foreign creditors in period t=0 can exist. Foreign creditor behavior has
18Note, to simplify the analysis I exclude creditor payoffs in the event of bank bankrupcy, which does
not add value to this particular analysis or alter the results.
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the complementary property if there are increasing returns from pooled investment: a
greater number of foreign creditors who deposit in the emerging market increases the
long-term return, thus increasing a foreign creditor’s incentive to deposit in the emerging
market. Such behavior is an example of herding. However, in taking into account their
expected long-term payoffs in period t=2, foreign creditors are less willing to deposit if
more creditors deposit. This response is due to the expected cost of a bank run: a greater
number of foreign creditors depositing in the emerging market bank also can raise the
number of foreign creditors who run, thereby raising the likelihood of a null long-term
payoff. Foreign creditors’ behavior then exhibit the property of strategic substitutability.
Thus, behavioral interactions of foreign creditors governing their decision to invest abroad
has interesting, contradictory properties.
1.5.1 Capital Controls on Inflows and the Probability of Bank Runs
Since I am interested in the indirect impact of a capital control τ on the probability
of a financial crisis, I can use equation 5 to determine the impact of τ on the threshold
ψF . A higher ψF implies a greater probability that foreign creditors will invest abroad;
this can in turn impact the probability of banks runs by foreign and by local creditors, i.e.
θF and θL, respectively. Given that d, the share of foreign investors who invest abroad,
equals H(ψF − ψ), changing the variable of integration and then differentiating equation
(5) with respect to τ gives:
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−1 = [
∞∫
−∞
∂u
∂r2
· ∂r2(ψF −H
−1(d))
∂ψ
dd]
∂ψF
∂τ
(1.6)
Since ∂u/∂r2 > 0 and ∂r2/∂ψ > 0 hold by assumption, it follows that ∂ψF /∂τ < 0.
This condition implies that a higher capital control reduces the threshold signal of foreign
creditors, i.e. reduces the likelihood of foreign creditors investing abroad.
Given this result, I must show how the capital control τ affects the probability of cap-
ital flight (captured by θF ) and the probability of domestic bank runs (captured by θL).
Recalling that the level of inflows d is H(ψF − ψ) and differentiating equations 3 and 4
with respect to d, I can infer the effect of inflows on the probability of runs. I conduct
similar analysis as before to prove the following property.
Property 2: θF and θL are both increasing in d.
Proof
To prove that θF and θL are both increasing in foreign inflows, I must show that Equa-
tion 3, which implicitly characterizes θL(d), is increasing θL and decreasing in d. Similarly
I must show that Equation 4, which implicitly characterizes θF (d), is increasing θF and
decreasing in d. These effects are ambiguous analytically. Therefore I solve the equations
numerically using d as a policy tool.
I first describe the analytical explanation. Equation 3 implicitly characterizes the
function θL(d). It remains to show that total net payoff is decreasing in d. In the first
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integral, the coefficient term is decreasing in d if the following condition holds: n <
G[θF − θL +G−1(n)], which reduces to θF > θL. Yet, the second payoff term is decreasing
in d if n > G[θF − θL +G−1(n)]. The inner bound of integration, n2, which is endogenous
in d, also complicates the sign of the derivative. The total net payoff of the entire region
is decreasing in d if the derivative of the first payoff term is larger in magnitude than the
derivative of the second term. If this holds, then θL is increasing in d. Additionally, the
effect of d on the total payoff is stronger (more negative) if G[θL − θF +G−1(m)] > δ, or
m > δ, i.e. there are runs by foreigners.
Equation 4 implicitly characterizes the function θF (d). It remains to show that the
total net payoff given in (3) is decreasing in d. In the first term, the exchange rate e2(·) is
decreasing in d. The coefficient in the first term is decreasing in d if the following condition
holds: m > G[θL − θF +G−1(m)], which reduces to θF > θL. However, the second payoff
term is decreasing in d if m < G[θL − θF + G−1(m)], holds. Hence, the total net payoff
of the entire region is decreasing in d if the derivative of the first payoff term is larger in
magnitude than the derivative of the second term. If this holds, then θF is increasing in
d. Additionally, the effect of d on the total payoff is stronger (so that the effect on θF
is more positive) if G[θL − θF +G−1(m)] > λ, or n > λ, i.e there are runs by local creditors.
The analytical results imply that global strategic complementarities between creditors
and inflows exist if certain conditions hold. Assuming away the possibility of insolvency and
endogenous bounds, the property relies on a condition for the threshold signals, θF > θL,
which implies m > n. The likelihood of foreign creditors to run must be higher than the
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likelihood of local creditors to run. If this condition holds, then θF,L is positively related
to d; a capital control τ on bank inflows that reduces d will lower the probability of capital
flight and of domestic bank runs. In other words, capital controls can indirectly reduce
the banking sector’s vulnerability to a crisis. However, the capital control must be set
such that m is still greater than n. Hence, it is not optimal to set the control to infinity;
in that case, m would be zero and the condition would be violated. In addition to this
condition, complementarities between foreign (local) creditors and foreign inflows intensify
if there are runs by local (foreign) creditors. Thus, complementarities between inflows and
creditors are more likely if runs exist, i.e. m > δ or n > λ.
I confirm strategic complementarities exist between creditor behavior and foreign in-
flows by numerically solving for θF and θL as before, but altering my policy tool, (d). I
find that decreases in d lower the probability of domestic runs, θL, and of capital flight,
θL. First, in Figure 8, I show the foreign creditor threshold function for varying levels
of inflows. I assume the same parameters as before: εl = εf = 0.1, f = 1, R1 = 1.01,
δ = λ = 0.1, and σ = 1.001.
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θL
θ F
d=1
d=0.7
θF(θL)
Figure A.16. Foreign Creditor Threshold Strategies
(Endogenous Exchange Rate, d = 1, 0.9, 0.7)
Figure 8 confirms that the capital inflows in the banking sector can adversely impact
the probability of both capital flight and domestic bank runs. In restricting inflows from
d = 1 to d = 0.9, the threshold strategies of foreign creditors (assuming an endogenous
exchange rate) shifts down and flattens. Interestingly, the same reduction in d causes a
shift down in the local creditor threshold function, but by a very minute degree. Thus,
the effect on foreign creditor thresholds is the primary factor in decreasing the equilibrium
probability of bank runs. Hence, for a given local creditor threshold, foreign creditor
thresholds are lower; foreign creditor runs are less likely if inflows are restrained. If more
foreign creditors invest in the bank, then the likelihood that foreign creditors will run
increases.
I now inspect how the equilibrium threshold values vary with the level of foreign de-
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posits (inflows d) when the exchange rate is endogenous in θ, mdf , and n, and when the
exchange rate is at a fixed level. Table D below provides equilibrium probabilities assuming
an endogenous (flexible) exchange rate.
Figure A.17. Impact of a Control on Inflows
d f θL θF θF − θL
1 1 0.289 0.299 0.011
.99 1 0.272 0.280 0.008
.98 1 0.255 0.260 0.005
.97 1 0.239 0.241 0.002
.96 1 0.223 0.222 -0.001
.95 1 0.218 0.211 -0.006
Figure A.17 shows how strategic complementarities explain the relative effect of a capi-
tal control on probabilities of domestic bank runs and capital flight. Due to complementar-
ities between foreign and local creditors, the likelihood that local creditors also decreases
when inflows are restricted. Moreover, if foreign and local creditors believe that more for-
eign creditors are depositing in the emerging market bank (a higher d), then foreign and
local creditors are both more likely to run on the bank. One explanation is that inflows
adversely impact exchange rate stability, thereby adversely impacting a foreign creditor’s
payoff. The property of strategic complementarities in this model can help explain why
large capital inflows can lead to heightened financial fragility and banking crises.
I contrast this impact of a capital control to the impact when the exchange is exogenous.
As Table D shows, a control on inflows reduces both probabilities of bank runs when the
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exchange rate is flexible. However, when the exchange rate is fixed, a control has minimal
impact: the probabilities do not change by a noticeable degree. Thus, the endogenous
exchange rate is not only more realistic, but is needed for a control to have an impact.
That is, a control is effective in reducing bank run probabilities through its effect on
exchange rate fluctuations and the foreign creditor’s payoff.
What does Figure A.17 say about the efficacy of capital controls as prudential policy
and lessening crisis vulnerability? Recall that the parameter d measures the relative level
of foreign deposits to local deposits, i.e. debt inflows. Since these inflows are primarily
short-term, ad capital controls are most effective in reducing short-term debt inflows, then
a reduction in d can capture the effect of a capital control on short-term debt inflows. As
the table shows, reductions in d are associated with reductions in bank run probabilities.
Hence, capital controls can be linked to reductions in bank run probabilities, or a lower
likelihood of financial crises.
1.5.2 Controls on Outflows
I now reformulate the foreign creditor’s problem in order to examine the impact of a control
on outflows. I assume that with probability P (κ > 0), the government in the emerging
market sets a control, κ, on outflows in period t=1. Outflows in this model are the early
withdrawals by foreign creditors. The control can limit these withdrawals by taxing the
short-term payment, R1.
Given a control, κ, the expected net payoff of the foreign creditor is now:
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P (κ > 0) · [
m(κ)∫
m=δ
(u(
df + 1− (mdf +G[ θL−θFσ +G−1(m)])R1 · (1− κ)
df + 1− (mdf +G[ θL−θFσ +G−1(m)])
·R2(·) · e2(·)− u(R1))dm
+
1∫
m2
(0− df + 1
(mdf +G[ θL−θFσ +G
−1(m)]) ·R1 · (1− κ)
· u(R1 · (1− κ)))dm]
+(1− P (κ > 0)) · [
m2∫
m=δ
(u(
df + 1− (mdf +G[ θL−θFσ +G−1(m)])R1
df + 1− (mdf +G[ θL−θFσ +G−1(m)])
·R2(·) · e2(·)− u(R1))dm
+
1∫
m2
(0− df + 1
(mdf +G[ θL−θFσ +G
−1(m)]) ·R1
· u(R1))dm] = 0(1.7)
where m(κ) =
(df+1)/(R1·(1−κ))−(θL−θF )/2εf
1+df and m2 is defined as before.
With a control, κ, the bank pays out a smaller amount to the foreign creditor in
period t=1–the period in which foreign creditors run. The short-term payment subject
to a control is instead R1 · (1 − κ). Setting κ > 0 leads to a reduction in the short-term
return for foreign creditors, thereby reducing the level of early withdrawals. As shown
in the previous section in Figure 3C, a reduction in the short-term return reduces both
equilibrium bank run probabilities. Thus, a control on outflows can lower the likelihood
of both domestic bank runs and of capital flight. However, since the short-term return
is reduced, this type of control reduces the degree of risk sharing. A control on outflows
entails a tradeoff between the cost of a bank run and the benefit of risk sharing.
Alternatively, the model allows for an additional formulation of a control on outflows
that does not entail this tradeoff. One can assume instead that the control, κ, limits
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the total level of withdrawals by foreign creditors. Since the bank sequentially services
its creditors in this model, this control would allow early withdrawals up to a designated
level. The end variable of integration over m in equation (4) is then κ < 1. The foreign
creditor’s problem is a slight modification of equation (7), except that range of integration
over m is [δ, κ] and the short-term payment is simply R1.
19 Thus, this specification of a
control on outflows does not yield the cost of reduced risk sharing.
Another difference between the two formulations is the impact on the bounds of in-
tegration, which determine the regions of solvency and insolvency. If κ is a quantitative
control and thereby set as a tax on the short-term payment, then the bound, m2, is
increased. The region of solvency becomes larger, while the insolvency region becomes
smaller. On the other hand, if κ is set a qualitative control, then the region of insolvency
becomes smaller, while the region of solvency is unaffected. In this case, κ could be set so
as to preclude the possibility of insolvency.
An essential question then is how the impact of a control on outflows compares to
that of a control on inflows. The first specification on a control on outflows has a direct
impact on a foreign creditor’s payoff through its effect on R1, while the second (qualitative)
specification has a more indirect impact similar to that of the control on inflows. Since the
previous section has already shown that a control modeled as a tax on R1 reduced both
19The payoff when the control is imposed, i.e. the term multiplied by P (κ > 0) in equation (7), becomes:
P (κ > 0) · [
m2∫
m=δ
(u(
df + 1 − (mdf +G[ θL−θF
σ
+G−1(m)])R1
df + 1 − (mdf +G[ θL−θF
σ
+G−1(m)])
·R2(·) · e2(·) − u(R1))dm
+
κ∫
m2
(0 − df + 1
(mdf +G[ θL−θF
σ
+G−1(m)]) ·R1
· u(R1))dm]
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bank run probabilities, I focus my analysis of κ modeled as a qualitative control. This
specification does not give an unambiguous prediction for the impact on bank runs since
its impact on creditor payoffs is indirect. I now compute the impact of increases in κ on
the equilibrium given an endogenous and an exogenous exchange rate. Tables E and F
give the results.
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Figure A.18. Controls on Outflows vs. Inflows
Control on Control on
Inflows Outflows
d 1− κ θL θF θF − θL θL θF θF − θL
1 1 0.289 0.299 0.011 0.289 0.299 0.011
.99 .99 0.272 0.280 0.008 0.150 0.165 0.015
.98 .98 0.255 0.260 0.005 0.110 0.114 0.004
.97 .97 0.239 0.241 0.002 0.070 0.062 -0.008
.96 .96 0.223 0.222 -0.001 0.061 0.033 -0.027
.95 .95 0.218 0.211 -0.006 0.050 0.004 -0.046
Figure A.19. Impact of a Control on Outflows
(σ = 1.5)
e2 = 0.95 e2 = 1 e2 = 1.05
1− κ d θL θF θF − θL θL θF θF − θL θL θF θF − θL
.40 1 0.23 0.21 -0.022 0.20 0.09 -0.110 0.19 0.01 -0.183
.60 1 0.23 0.21 -0.018 0.20 0.11 -0.087 0.19 0.03 -0.160
.80 1 0.26 0.26 -0.003 0.21 0.16 -0.043 0.19 0.09 -0.104
.90 1 0.28 0.28 -0.001 0.22 0.19 -0.026 0.20 0.12 -0.075
.95 1 0.30 0.30 0.000 0.23 0.21 -0.014 0.20 0.15 -0.052
.96 1 0.31 0.31 0.001 0.23 0.22 -0.012 0.20 0.16 -0.045
.97 1 0.31 0.32 0.001 0.24 0.23 -0.010 0.21 0.17 -0.037
.98 1 0.32 0.32 0.001 0.24 0.24 -0.007 0.21 0.19 -0.027
.99 1 0.34 0.34 0.002 0.26 0.26 -0.003 0.23 0.22 -0.014
1 1 0.37 0.37 0.002 0.29 0.29 0.000 0.27 0.27 -0.002
Figure A.18 contrasts the impact of a control on inflows and the impact of a control on
outflows. A control on outflows, κ, and on inflows, d decrease both bank run probabilities.
However, a control on outflows reduces these probabilities by several percentage points
more. The results imply that a control on outflows may be relatively more effective in
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terms of crisis mitigation.
Figure A.19 offers an additional contrast between controls on outflows and inflows: the
impact of a control on outflows given an exogenous exchange rate. Unlike a control on
inflows, limiting the level of foreign withdrawals lowers both the probability of domestic
runs and of capital flight when the exchange rate is constant, or exogenous. Additionally,
when inflows are reduced, the probability of capital flight becomes lower than the domestic
run probability, i.e. runs by foreigners are less likely. In the event where the exchange
rate depreciates, runs by foreigners are no longer more likely than local creditors if inflows
are reduced. The result is powerful, implying that the limiting inflows offsets the effect
of exchange rate depreciation of raising the probability of capital flight. This result is
also in stark contrast to the impact of a control on inflows. While a control on inflows
has minimal impact, a control on outflows leads to a substantial reduction on both the
probability of capital flight and of domestic bank runs for different exchange rate levels.
My results in Figures A.18 and A.19 confirm the findings of previous empirical studies
on the outflow controls. According to Magud et al. (2011), controls on outflows are rela-
tively more effective in reducing real exchange rate pressures and the level of inflows. Fewer
economies, however, have used this policy. Argentina, Malaysia, Spain, and Thailand are
such EMEs. Studies have found that controls in Malaysia and Thailand were effective in
reducing inflows and exchange rate pressures, which contribute to financial crises. Never-
theless, controls on outflows are less effective in altering the maturity composition of flows
than controls on inflows.
From the bank run probabilities of Figure A.19, I derive the probability of bank insol-
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vency, or the probability that the bank runs out of all funds in the first period due to a
high level of early withdrawals. The probability of insolvency is then the probability that
the true state θ satisfies the following condition: m(θ)df + n(θ) > (1 + df)/R1. These
probabilities corresponding to the values in Table E are given below in Figure A.20. As
expected, I find that the probability of insolvency moves congruently with the level of
outflows and probability of bank runs, shown in Figure A.20. Interestingly, on an absolute
scale, the probability of insolvency is less than the probability of a bank run. I also find
that the probability of insolvency also moves congruently with the level of inflows (not
shown).
Figure A.20. Probabilities of Insolvency
(σ = 1.5)
1− κ f e2 = 0.95 e2 = 1 e2 = 1.05
.95 1 0.17 0.08 0.04
.96 1 0.18 0.09 0.05
.97 1 0.18 0.09 0.05
.98 1 0.18 0.09 0.05
.99 1 0.19 0.10 0.06
1 1 0.21 0.13 0.10
1.5.3 Other Applications
This model framework allows for various other policy questions to be assessed. One
extension is examining the currency composition of foreign deposits. The model assumes
that the short-term return from foreign deposits is obtained only in local currency. How-
ever, one can assume that a portion α of the short-term return from foreign deposits is
obtained in dollars, while (1− α) is obtained in the local currency. These assumptions on
currency composition provide a more realistic characterization of bank deposits and allows
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for a more direct analysis of policies such as a limit of foreign-currency denominated de-
posits used in economies like Brazil. Moreover, more direct modeling of foreign-currency
debt is essential since foreign-currency debt ranks above local-currency denominated debt,
both which rank above portfolio equity investment and foreign direct investment (Ostry et
al., 2010). This study applies more to controls on debt inflows since those policies target
the share of debt liabilities. On the other hand foreign exchange related policies such as
requirements on foreign exchange deposit accounts have a more direct effect on currency
composition and an indirect effect on debt liabilities.
A second application is a modification to the long-term return. Since this study applies
to EMEs, a relevant assumption is increasing returns to scale on pooled aggregate invest-
ment. To embody this in the model, the long-term return R2 would then be endogenous
in not only θ, but the level of runs, m and n. Further, increasing returns implies that the
return would be decreasing in the level of runs. Increasing returns may have interesting
effects on the structure of strategic complementarities.
Additionally, the results in Figures A.18 to A.20 can be linked to capital account data
on EMEs. Figures A.18 and A.19 gives the bank run probabilities for varying levels of
inflows and outflows, while Figure A.20 gives the insolvency probabilities. Since EMEs
differ in the relative size of their capital account and portfolio investment, they differ
in the relative size of foreign deposits in banks, or the parameter d, and in the size of
outflows. The results can offer different conclusions for EMEs with relatively smaller or
larger portfolio investment.
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1.6 Empirical Analysis
In contrast to previous literature, I use bank-level data and thus am able to evaluate
the impact on bank confidence. In a microeconomic perspective I am also able to better
understand the role of controls as a prudential measure. I analyze the impact of capital
controls in the banking sector in an event-study framework.20 My set of variables are bank
stock prices, which can measure bank confidence in the financial market in response to
capital control announcements. More specifically, I use the abnormal returns of individual
bank stock prices as a proxy for the probability of bank runs.21 As expressed earlier,
however, my model does not directly predict how bank stock prices should respond to
capital controls, but only implies that controls should increase bank confidence by lowering
the likelihood of bank runs. A positive abnormal return denotes an increase in bank
confidence, implying that the control added value to the banking sector by lessening crisis
vulnerabilities. By obtaining the announcement dates of the controls, I quantify the effect
of controls from the abnormal returns of announcements from regressions.
1.6.1 Data and Methodology
The dates of the IOF (foreign exchange transactions) tax in Brazil and of bank regu-
lations in Korea define the time frame of analysis. Tables H and I list of policies in Brazil
and in South Korea, respectively. Brazil first imposed the IOF tax at a rate of 0.38 percent
on fixed income foreign exchange transactions after expiring the CPMF ‘check’ tax as of
20Event studies determine whether a specific event caused a statistically significant reaction in financial
markets. Studies examine the impact of monetary or fiscal policy or bank regulation announcements on
financial variables, e.g. credit and liquidity risk premia (Ait-Sahali et al., 2010) or bank stock prices (Mink
and Haan, 2012; Veronesi and Zingales, 2010).
21Veronesi and Zingales (2010) compute the impact of the TARP bailout using abnormal returns of the
10 U.S. big banks.
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January 1, 2008. The government implemented a 1.5 percent IOF tax in March 2008, then
reduced the tax to zero in October 2008. Following the subprime crisis Brazil re-imposed
the IOF tax reimposed in October 2009. Subsequent hikes, modifications and other cap-
ital flow management measures, such as reserve requirements on banks’ dollar positions,
followed through May 2012. Capital controls in South Korea began in November 2009,
with the most recent policy announced in August 2012. Given these dates, I choose the
post-crisis time frame of the event study for both economies to be 6/1/2009 to 6/1/2012.
I obtain daily frequency stock price data from Datastream totaling 16 Brazilian banks
and 16 South Korean banks. I use Brazil’s national stock exchange index, Bovespa, and
South Korea’s stock exchange index, Kospi, as covariates in order to control for movements
in the overall stock market. The coefficients of the dummies for each policy announcement
quantify the abnormal return, or the return after controlling for the overall market move-
ments. The regression for each bank i is given below, where stock return variables are log
changes and the policy variables are dummies for the day of each announcement, m.
4StockReturnit = β0 + β14NationalStockIndext +
∑
βmPolicym + εt (1.8)
AbnormalReturnim = 4StockReturnim −4ExpectedReturnim
In addition, I compute the cumulative abnormal return of all announcements for each
bank to capture the overall effect of controls during their implementation period. I run
an additional regression in order compute the cumulative abnormal returns and their
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statistical significance for each bank. According to the regression equation below, for bank
i, the cumulative abnormal return is given by the coefficient on the final dummy variable,
Policyn.
22
4StockReturnit = β0 + β14NationalStockIndext + β1(Policy1 − Policy2)
+(β1 + β2)(Policy2 − Policy3) + ...+ (β1 + ...+ βn)Policyn + εt
1.6.2 Results
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 give the responses of Brazilian bank stock prices to capital control
announcements in the post-crisis period, 1/1/2009 to 6/1/2012. Half of the Brazilian
banks reacted positively to the first announcement of the IOF tax given by the positive
abnormal returns. For subsequent hikes, more than half reacted positively, except for the
third increase. The reserve requirement on dollar positions yielded a positive response
for only 4 banks. The first announcement extending the IOF to longer maturities had a
significant and positive impact for a vast majority of banks, yet a negative impact for most
banks for further extensions. A majority of banks had a significant, negative response to
the reduction in the IOF on foreign borrowings. On average banks reacted positively to
post-crisis capital controls.
As in Aizenman et al. (2011), I contrast the post-crisis responses to pre-crisis responses
22Cumulative abnormal returns can alternatively be computed by the following approximation: (pt+n −
pt)/pt = [(1 + ((pt+n − pt+n−1)/pt+n−1)) ∗ ... ∗ (1 + ((pt+1 − pt)/pt))] − 1, where n is the final period.
However, this method does not permit us to compute the level of significance of the cumulative coefficients.
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of Brazilian banks. One would expect that banks should react less positively to controls
in the pre-crisis period since these controls were less motivated by crisis concerns. Tables
1.3 and 1.4 report the pre-crisis responses to the first IOF announcement in March 2008 as
well as the announcement of the IOF removal. The time frame is 1/1/2008 to 12/1/2008.
Only half of the banks had significant, positive reactions to the IOF announcement and
significant, negative reactions to the IOF removal. However, all banks, except for five, had
more negative (or less positive) responses to the announcement of the IOF than to the
first post-crisis announcement. Thus, one can conclude that Brazilian banks reacted more
favorably to the IOF in the post-crisis period.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 give the responses of Korean bank stock prices to capital control
announcements. In contrast to Brazilian banks, relatively more Korean banks responded
negatively to policy announcements. Interestingly, announcements of the first and second
probes, which instituted audits on banks’ foreign exchange derivatives trading, had sig-
nificant negative impact on a vast majority of banks. A majority of bank, however, had
significant and positive responses to restrictions on foreign exchange lending.
Given that each bank had both negative and positive responses to policy announce-
ments in the post-crisis period, a more useful statistic is the cumulative abnormal return
of all announcements. Table 1.7 reports the cumulative returns for each Brazilian and Ko-
rean bank, i.e. the cumulative effect of all capital control announcement on each bank.The
asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance.23 Among the returns that were sig-
nificant, capital controls yielded positive returns for a majority of Brazilian banks (10 out
23*** denotes 1% significance level, ** denotes 5% significance level, and * denotes 10% significance level
for two-side tests of the coefficients.
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of 16). Controls, therefore, caused significant increases in bank stock prices that amounted
to over 8 percent for 3 banks. I conclude that capital controls may have improved bank
confidence in Brazil. For South Korea, however, only 2 banks had positive, statisically
significant responses to all announcements. If the probe announcements are excluded, cu-
mulative returns were positive for 6 banks. Nonetheless, a vast majority of Korean banks
had significant and negative responses to capital control announcements. I conclude that
capital controls in South Korea may not have been as effective in improving bank confi-
dence since most bank stock prices dropped in response to the series of announcements.
There are several explanations for these empirical findings. First, the overall negative
response among Korean banks somewhat confirms my findings for the theoretical impact
of controls. My theoretical results imply that controls on inflows may not be as effective
as outflow controls in averting financial crises. Since empirical studies have also confirmed
that outflow controls are relatively more effective in reducing exchange rate pressures,
controls on inflows in Korea since 2009 may have been viewed as less effective. Second,
Korean banks may perceive the controls as outrightly adverse and discriminatory; they may
believe controls as costly by restricting the efficient capital inflow and outflow on balance
sheets. Averting future crises and limiting currency appreciation may have been less of a
concern. Another reason that the responses of Brazilian and Korean banks differed is due
to the types of controls used in each respective economy. Brazil employed controls more
directly targeting inflows of capital, while Korea employed controls more directly bank
balance sheet composition. Brazilian controls may then be perceived as more effective
as a prudential measure in lowering crisis vulnerability. Finally, a fourth reason is the
61
overall publicity and government involvement in the implementation of controls. Controls
in Brazil may had had a more convincing selling point, and thus were perceived as more
beneficial for macroeconomic and financial stability.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper developed a global game model of information-based bank runs to assess
the prudential role of capital controls. An important contribution to the literature is in-
cluding both domestic and foreign creditors in a banking sector model, which uncovers how
creditors act and react to each other. These risk averse creditors benefit from international
risk sharing. Yet, the creditors face the cost of bank runs and, if foreign, exchange rate
fluctuation. Thus, the framework captures several financial frictions–bank runs, exchange
rate risk, and strategic complementarities between creditors. First, I prove that global
strategic complementarities exist between foreign and local creditors. In this case an in-
crease in the likelihood of bank runs by foreign creditors increases the likelihood of runs
by local creditors, and vice versa.
Next, I use the model for policy analysis. Another contribution of this paper is pro-
viding a model for assessing the impact of a capital control on the probability of bank
runs. I find that a limit of bank inflows–a type of capital control–lowers the probability
of domestic bank runs and capital flight. The probability of capital flight, however, de-
creases by more. I quantify the probabilities of bank runs and show how they vary with
the exchange rate and the level of bank inflows. I contrast these findings to the impact of
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a control on outflows, or withdrawals by foreign creditors. I find that a control on outflows
is more effective in reducing the probability of both capital flight and domestic bank runs.
Finally, I compute the probability of bank insolvency and find that it varies monotonically
with outflows, inflows, and bank run probability. My results not only identify the link
between capital controls and crisis vulnerability, but yield conclusions on the effectiveness
of different types of controls. Such results underscore that the relative impact of a control
on outflows and a control on inflows deserves more scrutiny in the literature.
Finally, I test the findings of my theory using the abnormal returns of Brazilian and
Korean bank stock prices. I find that banks had significant reactions to the announcement
of controls. The responses of Brazilian banks confirm my results since capital controls
improved bank confidence of a majority of banks in the sample. In comparing the post-
crisis to pre-crisis responses, I find that Brazilian banks reacted more favorably to the
IOF in the post-crisis period. Additionally, my model’s finding that a control on inflows is
relatively less effective can provide an explanation for the mixed reactions among banks,
particularly in South Korea. Overall, my findings provide both theoretical and empirical
evidence that capital controls can help avert financial crises, as is their intended goal. More
importantly, this study serves as a benchmark framework for additional policy analysis and
theoretical extensions.
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Table 1.1: Brazilian Bank Stock Prices, Post-Crisis
ABC Alfa Amazonia Banco Brasil Estado Rio Bicbanco Bradesco Cruzeiro
Bovespa 0.7334∗∗∗ 0.1631∗∗ 0.4964∗∗∗ 0.9504∗∗∗ 0.8292∗∗∗ 0.6710∗∗∗ 0.9241∗∗∗ 0.2286∗∗∗
(0.0589) (0.0638) (0.0606) (0.0379) (0.0641) (0.0555) (0.0272) (0.0557)
IOF Announcement 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ -0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0013)
ADR Announcement -0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗ -0.0187∗∗∗ -0.0703∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0008)
IOF Increase 0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0017 -0.0057∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0516∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0011)
IOF Increase -0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Reserve Requirement -0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0016∗ -0.0137∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008)
IOF Increase -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0088∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0008)
IOF Extended 0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0112∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗ -0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Tax on Derivatives -0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗ -0.0360∗∗∗ -0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0011)
IOF Extended 0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0432∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0018)
IOF Extended 0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0065∗∗∗ -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007)
IOF Reduction 0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0031)
Constant 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784
R2 0.206 0.020 0.106 0.531 0.238 0.200 0.646 0.056
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.2: Brazilian Bank Stock Prices, Post-Crisis cont. 
 
 Daycoval Indusval Itau Unibanco Mercantil Panamericano Parana Pine Sofisa 
Bovespa 0.4009*** (0.0516) 
0.3337*** 
(0.0552) 
0.9957*** 
(0.0337) 
0.5248*** 
(0.0917) 
0.6195*** 
(0.0634) 
0.3977*** 
(0.0509) 
0.4246*** 
(0.0587) 
0.4840*** 
(0.0712) 
IOF Announcement 0.0078*** (0.0011) 
-0.0031*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0148*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0060*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0211*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0464*** 
(0.0014) 
ADR Announcement 0.0115*** (0.0007) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0214*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0663*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0450*** 
(0.0008) 
IOF Increase -0.0188*** (0.0010) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0120*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0051*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0171*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0276*** 
(0.0013) 
IOF Increase 0.0019 (0.0015) 
0.0012 
(0.0015) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0354*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0452*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0055*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0133*** 
(0.0020) 
Reserve Requirement -0.0138*** (0.0008) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0174*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0198*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0242*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0010) 
IOF Increase 0.0026*** (0.0007) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0104*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0013 
(0.0013) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0092*** 
(0.0009) 
IOF Extended 0.0002 (0.0009) 
0.0104*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0806*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0046*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0025** 
(0.00011) 
Tax on Derivatives 0.0258*** (0.00011) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.00011) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0093*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0097*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0102*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0015) 
IOF Extended -0.0435*** (0.0017) 
0.0278*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0021* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0262*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0301*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0558*** 
(0.0023) 
IOF Extended -0.0421*** (0.0007) 
0.0756*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0092*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0079*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0012 
(0.0008) 
0.0060*** 
(0.0009) 
IOF Reduction -0.0076*** (0.0029) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0181*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0290*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0135*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0082*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0039) 
Constant 0.0003 (0.0007) 
0.0001 
(0.0007) 
0.0000 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0010) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
-0.0005 
(0.0008) 
Observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 
R2 0.089 0.073 0.624 0.048 0.106 0.106 0.120 0.101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1.3: Brazilian Bank Stock Prices, Pre-Crisis 
 
 ABC Alfa Amazonia Banco Brasil Estado Rio BicBanco Bradesco Cruzeiro 
Bovespa 0.5796*** (0.1239) 
0.2886*** 
(0.0656) 
0.6801*** 
(0.1667) 
1.0946*** 
(0.0561) 
0.8492*** 
(0.0691) 
0.6905*** 
(0.1539) 
1.0023*** 
(0.0559) 
0.6201*** 
(0.0783) 
First IOF Announcement 0.0001 (0.0001) 
0.0075*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0209*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0279*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0237*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0293*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0098*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0773*** 
(0.0021) 
IOF Removal -0.0524*** (0.0131) 
-0.0099 
(0.0067) 
0.0491*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.0493*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0065 
(0.0075) 
-0.0435*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0438*** 
(0.0087) 
Constant -0.0035 (0.0023) 
-0.0017 
(0.0019) 
-0.0021 
(0.0030) 
0.0000 
(0.0015) 
-0.0007 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052** 
(0.0027) 
0.0007 
(0.0012) 
-0.0026 
(0.0021) 
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
R2 0.248 0.102 0.205 0.713 0.467 0.266 0.777 0.288 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Table 1.4: Brazilian Bank Stock Prices, Pre-Crisis cont. 
 
 Daycoval Indusval Itau Unibanco Mercantil Panamericano Parana Pine Sofisa 
Bovespa 0.8753*** (0.1214) 
0.3292*** 
(0.0787) 
1.0525*** 
(0.0673) 
0.1362** 
(0.0670) 
0.7282*** 
(0.1651) 
0.4659*** 
(0.0929) 
0.7305*** 
(0.0839) 
0.4880*** 
(0.0896) 
First IOF Announcement 0.0225*** (0.0023) 
0.0076*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0335*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0038** 
(0.0018) 
0.0007 
(0.0026) 
0.0115*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0145*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0023) 
IOF Removal 0.0047 (0.0129) 
0.0419*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0178** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0368*** 
(0.0074) 
0.0056 
(0.0180) 
-0.0901*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0556*** 
(0.0096) 
0.0093 
(0.0094) 
Constant -0.0033 (0.0023) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0015 
(0.0015) 
-0.0022 
(0.0017) 
-0.0030 
(0.0025) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0040** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0044* 
(0.0023) 
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
R2 0.406 0.122 0.707 0.040 0.272 0.236 0.401 0.170 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1.7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Announcements
Brazilian Bank Cumulative Return Korean Bank Cumulative Return
ABC 0.010* Cheju -0.020***
Alfa 0.033*** Hana -0.029***
Amazonia 0.016* Industrial -0.018***
Banco Brasil -0.007* Jeonbuk -0.059***
Estado Rio 0.034*** Jinheung -0.049***
Bicbanco 0.031*** KB -0.050***
Bradesco -0.023*** Korea Bone -0.117***
Cruzeiro 0.002 Korea Exchange -0.049***
Daycoval -0.068*** Korea Savings -0.038
Indusval 0.087*** Kumho -0.036***
Itau Unibanco -0.041*** Pureun -0.035***
Mercantil 0.087*** Seoul 0.067***
Panamericano 0.003 Shinhan 0.015***
Parana 0.021*** Shinmin -0.034***
Pine 0.019*** Solomon -0.148***
Sofisa 0.084*** Woori 0.003
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Table 1.8. Capital Controls in Brazil, 2009-2012
Announcement Date Effective Date Event
3/12/2008 3/17/2008 IOF tax of 1.5% on bonds
10/22/2008 10/23/2008 IOF tax reduced to zero
10/19/2009 10/20/2009 IOF tax of 2% on equities and bonds
11/19/2009 11/19/2009 ADR tax of 1.5%
10/4/2010 10/5/2010 IOF tax increases to 4% on bonds and equity funds
10/18/2010 10/19/2010 IOF tax increases to 6% on bonds and derivatives
12/15/2010 1/4/2011 Tax reductions for longer maturity bonds and private equity
1/6/2011 4/4/2011 Reserve requirement of 60% for USD positions
3/29/2011 3/29/2011 IOF tax increased to 6% on bonds with maturities up to 1 year
4/6/2011 4/7/2011 IOF tax modified to cover maturities up to 2 years
7/27/2011 7/27/2011 Tax of 1% to 25% on forex derivatives
12/1/2011 12/2/2011 Removal of 2% IOF tax on equities and certain debentures
3/1/2012 3/1/2012 IOF tax on bonds extended to cover maturities up to 3 years
3/12/2012 3/12/2012 IOF tax on bonds extended to cover maturities up to 5 years
5/21/2012 5/22/2012 IOF tax on borrowing by individuals to 1.5% from 2.5%
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Table 1.9. Capital Controls in South Korea, 2009-2012
Announcement Date Effective Date Event
11/19/2009 11/19/2009 Limits on forwards trading, requirements on foreign treasury bond holdings
6/13/2010 6/14/2010 Limits on FX derivatives holdings
6/22/2010 7/1/2010 Barring of FX loans for domestic use
10/5/2010 10/19/2010 Probe on FX derivatives trading
11/18/2010 1/1/2011 14% tax on government bonds, 20% capital gains levy
12/19/2010 8/1/2011 Levy on FX liabilities
4/21/2011 4/26/2011 Probe on FX derivatives trading
5/19/2011 6/1/2011 Limits on FX derivatives
8/8/2012 1/2016 Tax of 0.001% on futures and 0.01% on option premiums
10/30/2012 11/2012 Probe on FX forward positions
11/27/2012 1/1/2013 Limits on FX derivatives tightened
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Chapter 2
Post-Crisis Capital Account
Regulation in Emerging Market
Economies
2.1 Introduction
The regulation of cross-border capital flows was the norm during the Bretton Woods era.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, many developed countries significantly liberalized their
capital markets and began encouraging their developing country counterparts to follow
suit. The move to capital market liberalization has theoretical justification, but does
not hold up to the empirical evidence, at least in the case of the liberalization of short-
term capital flows in emerging market and developing countries. Indeed, the role that
unstable capital flows played in the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s questioned
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the merits of capital account liberalization in developing countries for many economists
and policy-makers alike. Leading up to the global financial crisis, attention had thus
shifted to identifying the ‘threshold’ level of income and institutional development whereby
capital market liberalization could become associated with growth and financial stability
in developing countries.
The global financial crisis has elevated this debate once again. Many economists have
pointed out how unstable cross-border capital flows were at the root of the crisis–with the
United States borrowing $5 trillion from foreigners between 2001 and 2008 and one-third
of the nation’s housing debt owed to foreigners, and two-thirds of government debt by 2008
(Chinn and Frieden, 2011). What is more, a landmark International Monetary Fund (IMF)
position paper found that those emerging market and developing nations that deployed
capital controls (this term will be used interchangeably with ”capital account regulations”
and ”capital flow measures” throughout the paper) were among the least hard hit during
the crisis, leading the IMF to proclaim that capital account regulations are a legitimate
part of the macroeconomic policy toolkit (Ostry et al., 2010).
In the wake of the financial crisis, low interest rates and slow growth in the industri-
alized countries has triggered mass inflows to emerging market and developing countries
where interest rates and growth have been relatively higher. Low interest rates in those
countries when coupled with relatively higher interest rates in emerging market and devel-
oping countries made investment abroad more attractive. In the crisis aftermath between
2009 and 2012, the expansion of industrialized country balance sheets created significant
liquidity for global capital markets, and many investors took advantage of the ‘carry trade.’
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The carry trade is an investment strategy where an investor will borrow funds in a low-
interest rate nation and invest those funds in a higher interest rate country. The differential
between the two interest rates is referred to as the ‘carry.’ Investors not only profit from the
carry, but may also benefit for executing a complimentary derivative whereby an investor
goes short on the low interest rate currency and long on the high interest rate currency.
The carry trade and the ‘two speed’ growth in the world economy between 2009 and
2012 triggered massive capital flows to emerging market and developing economies, and by
2011 such flows reached the same levels as they had in the run up to the crisis. However,
when global capital markets have felt chilled, such as with the emergence of the Eurozone
crisis, there have been sudden stops of capital flows to developing countries and capital
flight to safety in industrialized country (chiefly U.S.) markets. The IMF and others
have expressed concern that such capital flow volatility is making it difficult for emerging
market exchange rates, asset markets and beyond (IMF, 2011a). Numerous countries have
responded to this volatility either by deploying capital controls or by intervening in foreign
exchange markets. For example, Turkey chose to lower interest rates to cut the carry
differentials, Indonesia put in place a withholding tax on bonds, Brazil regulated foreign
exchange derivatives as well as taxed bonds, Chile intervened in the foreign exchange
market, Peru put in place regulations on resident and non-resident holdings of currency.
In this comparative study we examine the financial interventions of two EMEs—Brazil
and Chile—and the relative effectiveness of their respective policies. In late 2009 Brazil
imposed a foreign exchange transactions (IOF) tax on foreign purchases of equities and
bonds, i.e. a tax on capital inflows. On the other hand, the Chilean central bank pursued
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foreign exchange market intervention through daily dollar purchases beginning in January
2011. Both countries implemented such measures in response to steep appreciation in their
exchange rates and heavy capital inflows that resulted in the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial crisis. Hence, our time frame of analysis is the post-crisis period, beginning in
early 2009 during which EMEs recovered substantially well and even experienced booms
in their exchange rate and asset price markets. The analysis ends in late 2011 when there
was a sudden stop in capital flows and currency runs to developing nations due to the
accentuation of the Eurozone crisis.
We investigate several macroeconomic outcomes in order to quantify the overall efficacy
of these measures. We test the impact on three main variables: each country’s equity
market indices, the level and volatility of exchange rates, and the volume and composition
of net capital inflows. Our findings are summarized in Figure B.1 below.
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Figure B.1. Summary of Measures to Manage Capital Flows in Brazil and Chile
Country Total Inflows Composition Asset Prices Exchange Rate Monetary Autonomy
Brazil Increased -Long-run impact: -No long-run impact. -Long-run impact: Increased
total inflows. Decreased short-term, -Short-run impact: decreased level monetary autonomy.
increased Announcements and volatility
long-term flows. reduced asset prices of Real.
-Short-run impact: but the -Short-run impact:
announcements cumulative effect decreased level
increased short-term, was offset by and volatility
decreased ADR announcement. only in first
long-term flows. announcement.
Chile No effect. No effect. -No long-run impact. -No long-run impact. No effect.
-Short-run impact: -Short-run impact:
Made domestic Decreased
stock market level of peso
more independent after the announcement
from regional index. -Temporary IOF
-Temporary IOF spillover effects.
spillover effects.
In Brazil, we find that the introduction of capital controls was associated with an
increase in total inflows but that the composition was shifted from short to longer-term
inflows. We also find that Brazil’s measures had a lasting impact on the level and volatil-
ity of the exchange rate. In terms of asset prices, only announcements of controls were
effective, and were offset by regulations on the ADR market that send investors back to
Brazil. We also find that Brazil’s measures modestly increased the ability of Brazil to pur-
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sue an independent monetary policy. Chile’s currency interventions were less successful.
The announcement of currency intervention reduced the level of the exchange rate, but
not the volatility, and made the domestic stock market more independent from the region
as a whole. Chile’s interventions had no statistically significant impact on total inflows
of capital, the composition of inflows, or the ability of Chile to pursue an independent
monetary policy.
The paper is divided into six parts. Section 2 very briefly reviews some of the literature
on the theory and evidence pertaining to capital market liberalization and the use of capital
account regulations in general. Section 3 presents the experience of Brazil and Chile with
respect to capital flows during the post-crisis period and discusses our use of financial data
in the study. Section 4 outlines our modeling approach and methodology, while Section
5 presents the results of our analysis. A final section summarizes our conclusions and
suggests further work for research and policy.
2.2 Related Literature
The pendulum has swung back and forth, and now back again on the benefits of capital
market liberalization. In the wake of the Great Depression and World War II, the architects
of the Bretton Woods system were adamant that current account transactions should be
freely transferable, but that capital account transactions should not. Beginning in the late
1970s and 1980s that consensus began to change and capital market liberalization became
a norm in theory and a policy goal in practice. The pendulum swung yet again in the
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aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis. Since then a large body of theory and evidence
has arisen that justifies the regulation of cross-border finance.
Theoretical applications in the 1970s and 1980s point out that cross-border capital
account liberalization would reap benefits because then capital would flow to areas that
had a higher-return investment (i.e. EME and other countries in need of capital), and
make markets more stable by incentivizing international risk sharing and diversification.
It was further posited that capital market liberalization would enhance financial market
development, and thus spur economic growth (Henry, 2007). Theories examining the costs
of capital market openness relate to the incidence of crises, sudden stops, and capital flight.
A vast literature has emerged in defining the relationship between capital market openness
and bank and currency crises. The foundation of the recent literature has stemmed from
the Mundell-Fleming model, an open economy framework addressing the effects on foreign
exchange markets, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. A notable conclusion of this model
influencing theory and policy is the so-called trilemma: perfect capital mobility, a fixed
exchange rate regime, and independent monetary policy cannot all coexist; countries can
maintain at most two of the three. The trilemma is one explanation for the eruption of
currency crises in EMEs and the subsequent use of capital controls.
Studies have emphasized specific costs associated with capital openness, e.g. exchange
rate appreciation, negative externalities such as over-borrowing, increased vulnerability to
capital flight and crises. Hence, another subclass of this literature centers on the analysis
of the cost of short-term capital flows—an important source of volatility, excessive risk-
taking, and economic vulnerability. Short-term flows can be distortions to the competitive
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equilibrium since they are influenced heavily by private investor activity, e.g. in the form
of noise trading, speculation bubbles, etc. Theoretical studies have specifically modeled
these costs in order to derive the optimal policy. In particular, Aizenman (2010), Jeanne
and Korinek (2010), and Korinek (2011) are studies that have modeled capital flows as
sources of negative externalities, showing how they create a wedge between private and
social marginal benefits. These models then advocate capital controls as the optimal policy
that corrects the wedge and restores efficiency.
Stiglitz et al. (2006) outline adverse consequences of capital market liberalization,
with a focus on developing countries. First, open capital markets can create negative
externalities, in form of currency appreciations, depreciations, or reductions in credit sup-
ply. Externalities arise because individual investors due not internalize the social impact
of their borrowing and lending behavior. Second, open capital markets allow for coordi-
nation failures to more readily occur, due to heightened rollover risk which can lead to
capital flight. Third, loss of monetary discretion may happen, particularly because interest
rate fluctuations can cause large inflows or outflows. Fourth, imperfect information among
investors results in herd behavior that propagates panics. Fifth, currency and maturity
mismatches due to incomplete markets are prevalent and only heighten exchange rate and
interest rate risk. Finally, incomplete equity markets and informational asymmetries make
it difficult for countries to issue new equity in order to raise capital, thereby resorting more
to self-financing so that the gains from globalization are not had. All in all, the conse-
quences of open capital markets are costly, and raise the need for market interventions
such as capital controls, which, according to Stiglitz et al. (2006), are the most effective
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policy instruments.
The empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of controls is starkly mixed. Numerous
influential studies have concluded that (previous to the global financial crisis) that capital
market liberalization was associated with economic growth in industrialized countries, but
associated with a lack of growth and an increase in financial instability in developing
countries (Stiglitz, et al., 2006). Recent studies have shown that the benefit of growth can
only arise in economies that have reached a certain institutional threshold (Kose, Prasad,
and Taylor 2009, Prasad et al. 2003). Henry (2007) provides a survey of the theory and
evidence regarding capital market liberalization and growth, and two main conclusions
are the following: institutional development is a key ingredient to reaping the benefits of
capital openness, and empirical studies can be improved by employing a policy experiment
approach. Such an approach is utilized in this study, by which we measure the impact of
a policy before and after its onset.
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of capital flow management are usually country-
specific and target specific capital control policies. The results then range across countries
and across types of controls. However, Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) offer a com-
prehensive assessment of the existing literature. Their review first acknowledges the lack of
a unified theoretical framework, no common empirical methodology, and the heterogeneity
of empirical findings across studies. They then address these drawbacks by summarizing
studies of controls on inflows and outflows and of multi-country studies, and critiquing
their methods and results.
The authors argue that capital controls are imposed by EMEs to combat four fears: fear
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of appreciation, fear of hot-money (short-term) flows, fear of large inflows, and fear of loss
of monetary autonomy. Two additional fears are the fear of asset price bubbles and the fear
of capital flight (Ocampo and Palma 2008; Grabel 2003; Epstein 2003). Ostry et al. (2010)
found that those nations that deployed capital controls in the run up to the global financial
crisis were among the least hard-hit during the crisis. Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff
(2011) find that controls on inflows increased monetary policy independence, altered the
composition of capital flows, and reduced exchange rate volatility; controls did not reduce
the volume of net flows in most studies. Nevertheless, the effects, though statistically
significant, are temporary and small in magnitude. Finally, their review presents a theory
to justify the impact on flow composition. Using a portfolio balance approach, their model
shows how capital flow restrictions can lower the share of short-term investments. This
outcome will be tested in our study.
Several country-specific studies embody the empirical literature of capital controls that
relate most to our study. Studies on Brazil are similar in that they analyze capital con-
trols during the same post-crisis period, since 2009 to present. A recent study analyzes
the impact on Brazilian controls on inflows since 2009 on the prices of financial assets
and on exchange rate appreciation (Chamon and Garcia, 2013). They find that controls
were effective in distorting prices by making domestic assets relatively more expensive,
thereby making such assets less attractive to foreign investors. Yet, controls did not have
statistically significant effects on Real appreciation, but may have helped to strengthen the
effect of the interest rate cut later in the period. Levy-Yeyati and Kiguel (2009) quantify
the effectiveness of a specific Brazilian control, the IOF, on the Brazilian exchange rate
81
by running similar regression analyses to Chamon and Garcia (2013) and also find that
the measures had their desired effect. The study, however, tests only the impact of the
announcement of the tax, and not subsequent changes. Forbes et al. (2011) examines
the IOF tax in Brazil, but tests only the impact on portfolio flows, using the Emerging
Portfolio Fund Research database. Their novel dataset gives fund-level investments by
country, but only accounts for 5% to 20% of total country market capitalization. They
find evidence that controls reduce investor portfolio allocations to Brazil. Another study
on Brazilian controls focuses entirely on gross capital inflows, using micro-level data from
U.S. and European mutual funds (Jinjarak et al., 2012). This study tests the effectiveness
on controls in terms of counterfactuals and finds that controls had some short-term impact
in reducing inflows, yet the effect disappeared a few months after imposition.
A few studies have also investigated South Korean capital controls imposed since 2009.
The multi-country study examines the impact of inflow controls on a wider range of vari-
ables, mainly financial flows, GDP and exchange rates, including those of Brazil and
South Korea (Klein, 2012). The paper distinguishes long-standing controls from episodic
controls–the latter which are more temporary, target specific assets, and thus pertain more
to Brazilian and Korean controls. The study finds that such controls did not have signifi-
cant effects on any variable. One study specific to South Korea, Bruno and Shin (2012),
examines the impact of recent controls on banking sector flows and the Korean exchange
rate through a series of panel regressions, and thereby assesses the prudential effective-
ness of controls through its focus on the banking sector. They conclude that controls may
have had macroprudential effectiveness in reducing the sensitivity of capital flows to global
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changes.
As the next sections show, we build on these studies by incorporating additional policy
and modifications to the IOF tax through the end of 2011. We also examine a broader
range of macroeconomic variables, e.g. equity prices, exchange rates, and disaggregated
net inflows.
2.3 Background and Data
Brazil and Chile each intervened in the market to address the fears and concerns outlined
in the last section. Brazil deployed capital account regulations, Chile intervened in its
currency markets. Figure B.2 depicts the rise in the Brazilian exchange rate, which ap-
preciated over 40 percent between 2009 and 2011 before dropping during the worst of the
Eurozone crisis in September of 2011. Figure B.3 exhibits Brazil’s potential stock market
bubble that followed a similar trajectory during the same period. Figure B.4 shows the
corresponding rise in capital flows.
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Figure B.2. BRL
Figure B.3. Bovespa
Figure B.4. Brazil New Inflows
In our regressions for Brazil, all data for the asset price and exchange rate regressions
are daily frequency and are obtained from Bloomberg. For the Brazil regressions, our
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time period spans 1/5/2009 to 12/13/2011. For this time period, Figures B.2 and B.3,
respectively, display the course of the Bovespa, Brazil’s national stock exchange, and of the
Brazilian nominal exchange rate (Real) in terms of U.S. dollars. The vertical line in each
figure gives the date at which the IOF tax was first announced and imposed on October
19, 2009. The first announcement was followed by a string of tax hikes, modifications, as
well as other types of capital flow management. As can be seen, the first announcement
proceeded a period of steep appreciation in both asset prices and the exchange rate.
The dates of the announcements of controls were specified from news articles and
previous studies. Our event dates of interest are shown in Figure B.5 below. The dates
are important since they help determine the time frame of analysis.
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Figure B.5. Capital Account Regulations in Brazil, 2009-2012
Announcement Date Effective Date Event
10/19/2009 10/20/2009 IOF tax of 2% on equities and bonds
11/19/2009 11/19/2009 ADR tax of 1.5%
10/4/2010 10/5/2010 IOF tax increases to 4% on bonds and equity funds
10/18/2010 10/19/2010 IOF tax increases to 6% on bonds and derivatives
12/15/2010 1/4/2011 Tax reductions for longer maturity bonds and private equity
1/6/2011 4/4/2011 Reserve requirement of 60% for USD positions
3/29/2011 3/29/2011 IOF tax increased to 6% on bonds with maturities up to 1 year
4/6/2011 4/7/2011 IOF tax modified to cover maturities up to 2 years
7/27/2011 7/27/2011 Tax of 1% to 25% on forex derivatives
12/1/2011 12/2/2011 Removal of 2% IOF tax on equities and certain debentures
3/1/2012 3/1/2012 IOF tax on bonds extended to cover maturities up to 3 years
3/12/2012 3/12/2012 IOF tax on bonds extended to cover maturities up to 5 years
Data on capital and current account flows and GDP are monthly frequency and avail-
able on the Central Bank of Brazil website. Additional variables in the capital flow re-
gressions are taken from Bloomberg. These regressions cover November 2008 to November
2011. We begin our time frame at the end of 2008 in order to avoid the structural break
caused by the 2008 financial crisis. Figure B.4 below depicts this structural break in the
capital flow data, in which substantial capital outflows resulted in the second half of 2008,
but reversed their direction by the end of the year, resulting in positive net inflows by the
start of 2009. Here, we define the capital account as the sum of the capital account and
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financial account, as given by the central bank data website. The financial account is com-
posed of direct investment, portfolio investment, derivatives, and other investments, while
the capital account is much smaller in size. Any feature to note is the relative volatility of
FDI and non-FDI net inflows, as the latter includes more volatile, short-term investment
and governs the overall trend in the capital account.
After a significant domestic debate regarding which measure to use in order to stem
exchange rate appreciation and to prevent an asset bubble, Chile chose to conduct daily
dollar purchases. For Chile, our time period spans slightly longer, from 1/5/2009 to
3/30/2012, in order to include a period after which the intervention ended. Even though
Chilean interventions did not commence until the end of 2010, we use the early start date
to incorporate spillover effects of the IOF in our analysis. For this time period, Figures
B.6 and B.7, respectively, display the course of the Chilean nominal exchange rate (Peso)
in terms of U.S. dollars and the Santiago Stock Exchange, Chile’s national stock exchange.
The vertical lines denote the announcement and the termination of the Chilean currency
market intervention. Again, as in Brazil, we see that the intervention took place after a
period of appreciation in both the asset price and exchange rate markets.
87
Figure B.6. Chilean Peso
Figure B.7. Santiago Stock Exchange
Chile pursued a different policy of currency market intervention. As seen in the table
below, the Chilean Central Bank conducted daily purchases of $50 million U.S. dollars,
which lasted almost one year. A month prior to the intervention, the central bank also
raised the limit on foreign investment in pension funds to 80% from 60% in November
2010. The dates and policies are given below in Figure B.8.
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Figure B.8. Currency Market Intervention in Chile, 2010-2011
Announcement Date Effective Date Event
11/4/2010 12/2010 Increase in foreign investment limits on pension funds to 80% from 60%
1/3/2011 1/5/2011 Intervention program at a rate of $50 million USD a day
2/8/2011 2/9/2011 Continuation of daily USD purchases
3/8/2011 3/9/2011 Continuation of daily USD purchases
4/8/2011 4/11/2011 Continuation of daily USD purchases
10/7/2011 10/8/2011 Continuation of daily USD purchases
11/8/2011 11/9/2011 Continuation of daily USD purchases
12/9/2011 12/16/2011 Termination of currency intervention program
2.4 Methodology
In this study we examine the extent to which the interventions by Brazil and Chile had
an independent impact on exchange rate levels and volatility, asset appreciation, as well
as the scale, composition, and spillover impacts of capital inflows. The model specification
for each is discussed in this section.
Exchange Rates
We assess the impact of the capital controls on changes in the Brazilian and Chilean
nominal exchange rates by running a GARCH (1,1) regression. GARCH (1,1), or General
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model with 1 lag in the error term and
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1 lag in the variance term, allows us to not only study the impact on the level of the
exchange rate, but also its volatility. Before running this regression, we must first test for
heteroskedasticity, or ARCH effects, using Engle’s Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test. Here
we fit the model by OLS to test the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects. The LM test
gives p-values well below 0.05; hence, we can reject the null of no heteroskedasticity.
The model testing the impact on the level and volatility of exchange rates is given
below. The first equation gives the level regression, while the second gives the variance
regression. For the Chilean peso regression, we do not include the lagged variance term in
the second regression.
4BRLt = β0 +
∑
βnAnnouncent + β8∆Controlst +
+ β9∆Controlst ∗ 4Interest Ratet + β104Interest Ratet +Other Covariates+ εt (2.1)
σ2t = η0 + η1εt−1 + η2σ2t−1 + η3∆Controlst +
+ η4∆Controlst ∗ 4Interest Ratet + η54Interest Ratet +Other Covariates+ εt (2.2)
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with εt ∼ N(0, σ2t )
Our variables of interest here are the dummy for the day of the first announcement,
the dummy for the entire period for which the controls were in place, and the interaction
variable-the dummy for the entire period times the change in the domestic interest rate.
The coefficients on the dummies are the abnormal returns after controlling for the other
covariates. Description and calculation of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal
returns are given in the next section. The interaction term measures the extent to which
controls improved monetary autonomy: controls are successful in improving autonomy if
changes in the domestic interest rate have smaller or negative effects on the exchange rate.
The covariates are the regression are the change in the foreign interest rate (LIBOR) as
well as log changes in the dollar exchange index (DXY), commodity price index (GSCI)
and the JP Morgan Global Spread (EMBI).
Since capital inflows contribute to exchange rate appreciation, we would expect that a
control that restricted inflows would lessen appreciation in an economy’s currency, all else
equal. Such an outcome is one of the intended goals of the capital account regulation used
in Brazil (listed in Table B). Hence, one would expect a negative sign on the coefficients
of the announcement dummy variables and the control period dummy if the controls were
effective in dampening exchange rate appreciation in the short and long run, respectively.
As noted earlier, another intended goal is improving monetary policy independence.
The policy mechanism beyond this outcome relies on the trilemma, i.e. an economy cannot
have an open capital account, a fixed exchange rate, and independent monetary policy,
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but only at most two of the three. A country’s monetary policy is more independent
if the impact of a change in the policy rate is not offset by changes in the exchange
rate. For example, in a monetary expansion a reduction in interest rates may lead to
depreciation in the exchange rate, causing an increase in import prices and contributing to
higher inflation. Central banks of open economies with high inflation are then wary to use
monetary easing due to the adverse effect of inflation. Thus, if a control that lowers net
inflows (i.e. lowers gross inflows or raises gross outflows) improves monetary autonomy,
changes in the domestic interest rate should have a smaller effect on the exchange rate.
We would then expect a negative sign on our interaction variable of the control period
dummy and the domestic interest rate.
Asset Prices
Since high inflows of capital are pro-cyclical and often precipitate credit booms, capital
inflows can contribute to asset price bubbles (Calderon and Kubota, 2009). Thus, controls
on inflows have a policy goal of dampening asset bubbles. A control liberalizing outflows
would have a similar effect if net inflows were reduced.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the controls on curbing asset price appreciation, we
conduct an event study on the Brazilian national stock exchange (Bovespa) and the Chilean
national stock exchange (Santiago). Controlling for changes in the regional stock market,
proxied by the MSCI EM Latin America index, we compute the marginal and cumulative
abnormal returns of capital control announcements. Abnormal returns capture whether
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the controls caused a significant reaction in the stock market, controlling for changes in
the overall market. Hence, they effectively measure the difference between the actual and
expected return of the local stock market.
As an event study, we run regression of the log change in the Bovespa on dummies
for the announcement of the IOF tax and for subsequent policy modifications and on a
dummy for the period during which the equity tax was in place. The model regression,
along with the definition of abnormal returns, is given below.
4StockReturnt = β0 + β14Markett + (2.3)
+
∑
βmAnnouncem
+β9Controlst + β10Controlst ∗ 4Markett + εt
4AbnormalReturnt = 4StockReturnt −4ExpectedReturnt
Cumulative returns provide a better measure for the overall, long-run effect of the tax.
To obtain the cumulative abnormal returns, we run an additional regression. According
the regression equation below, the coefficient on the Announcen gives the cumulative
abnormal return of all the daily announcements.1
1One can also obtain cumulative abnormal returns by aggregating the marginal abnormal returns of
each announcement, which are given by the coefficients of the event dummy variables. In other words,
cumulative abnormal returns, where n is the final period, are computed by the following approximation:
(pt+n − pt)/pt = [(1 + ((pt+n − pt+n−1)/pt+n−1)) ∗ ... ∗ (1 + ((pt+1 − pt)/pt))] − 1.
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4StockReturnt = β0 + β14MarketReturnt + (2.4)
+β1(Announce1 −Announce2)
+...+ (β1 + ...+ βn)Announcen
+β9Controlst + β10Controlst ∗ 4MarketReturnt + εt
Announcement dummies are specified for the day after the announcement if announced
after trading hours. Along with the dummy variables, we include an interaction variable–
the regional market index times the overall control dummy–to capture the effect on local
equity market independence.
Scale, Composition, and Spillover Effects of Capital Flows
Analysis of the impact on the capital account is four-fold. First, we conduct a cross-
sectional regression of the Brazilian net capital inflows on capital control event dummies,
interest rate differentials, and other covariates. Second, we study the impact on the com-
position of capital flows by studying the following capital flow outcomes: FDI less non-FDI
flows and short-term versus long-term flows. Third, we run a panel regression of several
Latin American economies in order to better explain the deviation of Brazilian net inflows
from the regional trend in response to capital controls. Finally, we test for spillover effects
by studying the impact on Chilean flows in response to the Brazilian capital controls. Here,
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we run a cross-sectional regression of Chilean flows. All flows are given as a percentage of
GDP.
The model of the panel regressions is given by the general equation below. We use a
two-month dummy for the announcement of the first IOF tax in order to obtain a better
measure of the effect as well as more reliable standard errors. We use a multi-month dummy
specified for all announcements (to measure a cumulative effect of all announcements) and
another multi-month dummy specified for the months the tax is in place (to measure the
overall effect of the IOF implementation period). We also include time (month-specific)
effects to capture the overall trend of flows as well as any unobservable effects altering
the level of flows. Additional country-specific covariates include the current account, as a
percentage of country GDP, interbank domestic-US interest rate differential.
NetInflowit = β0 + β1CurAccit + β2Ci + β3Qt+
+β4Announceit + β5AllAnnounceDummyit + β5Controlsit + εt (2.5)
The cross-sectional regressions are similar and include more covariates. However, a
substantial drawback is the low number of observations as well as the presence of endo-
geneity of the regressors. We address endogeneity by running IV regressions, using the
lagged dependent variable as the instrument. We again use two-month dummies for each
announcement in order to obtain valid standard errors, as well as dummy for the entire pe-
riod when they are in place and a dummy for all announcements. Covariates are a lagged
dependent variable, the current account, VIX Volatility index, EMBI Global Spread, a
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Bloomberg carry trade index, the FX premium, and interbank interest rates. The carry
trade index measures the US short rate and the Brazilian long interest rate differential;
thus, a positive coefficient is expected since a higher index should attract flows into Brazil.
The model equation is given below.
NetInflowt = β0 + β1CurAcct +
∑
βjAnnouncejt+
+β7AllAnnounceDummyt + β8Controlst +
∑
βjCovariatesjt + εt (2.6)
We conduct analyses for total flows and disaggregated flows by decomposing net capital
inflows into short-term and long-term measures. The short-term, long-term decomposition
is similar to the FDI, non-FDI decomposition; non-FDI is composed largely of short-term
investment while FDI can be regarded as long-term investments. We improve the FDI,
non-FDI measure by stripping out long-term investment from portfolio investment and
other investments. Long-term investment is thus measured by the sum of these long-term
investments and FDI. Short-term investment is defined as short-term portfolio plus other
investment (trade credits, currency and deposits, loans) plus derivatives.
An important goal of capital controls that restrict inflows is to reduce not only gross
flows, but short-term inflows–inflows which are more speculative and volatile. Hence,
controls in South Korea would be effective if they reduced short-term flows. Similarly,
controls that reduced non-FDI or derivative inflows would accomplish the intended policy
goal as well. In these cases, we should look for significant, negative coefficients on the
dummy variables.
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2.5 Results and Analysis
Consistent with the literature reviewed above, we find that Brazil’s capital account regu-
lations had a significant but small impact on exchange rate levels and volatility, asset ap-
preciation, on monetary policy independence, and on the scale, composition, and spillover
effects of capital flows. In each of the other cases the impacts of the controls were tempo-
rary ‘speed bumps’ that allowed Brazil to lean against the wind but were far from enough
to change the course of the monetary ‘tsunami’ that afflicted Brazil during the period.
Chile’s interventions were less successful.
Exchange Rates
In Table 2.1 both the mean and variance regressions of the Brazilian exchange rate are
displayed. The first 8 variables listed are dummies of the day of each regulation announce-
ment. The ninth variable, ’Controls Dummy’ is a dummy for the entire period for which
the controls were in place. As given by the coefficients of the daily announcement dum-
mies, in the mean regression all announcements of controls have significant returns, with
the largest return of -1.9 percent coming from the first announcement of the IOF. The
cumulative returns of the announcements, however, amount to only -0.3 percent. The
control dummy for the entire period is also significant and negative, yet at a very small
magnitude of -0.1 percent. The control dummy also has a significant effect on exchange
rate volatility, with a coefficient of -0.77: a negative coefficient implies that the controls
decreased exchange rate volatility. All covariates–interest rate differential, DXY, GSCI,
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and EMBI–are significant in both regressions. The signs of the coefficients make economic
sense as well: an increase in the foreign interest rate, dollar exchange index, and EMBI
spread yields a lower nominal exchange rate, while an increase in the commodity price
index appreciates the exchange rate. Given the structure of the regression equation, all
coefficients in this regression are an approximate measure of the impact on the log variance
of the exchange rate. Finally, we find evidence of increased monetary autonomy, given by
the negative coefficient on the domestic interest rate interaction variable.
According to Table 2.2 currency market intervention also had significant effects on the
Chilean peso. We also find evidence of spillover effects from the IOF. The first five variables
listed are dummies for the day each policy was announced. The sixth variable, ‘Intervention
Period Dummy’, is the dummy for the entire period of the intervention. As captured by
the intervention announcement dummies, the announcement first had a positive impact of
0.4% on the peso level, but then a negative and larger impact the following two days of
-4.4% and -1.5%. The announcement of foreign investment limits also had a fairly large
effect of 1.4%. Overall though, the intervention period did not have significant effects on
either the level or volatility, as indicated by the intervention period dummy. Since the
coefficient on the interaction variable is not significant, we find no evidence of improved
monetary autonomy. The IOF announcement had a positive and significant impact on the
peso level, and a negative and significant impact on the volatility. We conclude that the
onset of Brazil capital controls influenced currency markets in Chile.
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Asset Prices
The results are reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. In Table 2.3 of Brazil stock prices, the
first nine variables listed apply to dummies of each announcement day, while the tenth
variable, ’Controls Dummy’ is a dummy for the entire period of the equity tax. According
to Table 2.3, the first announcement of the IOF tax induced a statistically significant, but
small drop of -0.3 percent in the Bovespa. All subsequent tax hikes yielded significant
(except the second increase), positive and small returns of less than one percent. The
modification announcement, which extended the tax to bonds with maturities up to 720
days, from 360 days, had a significant and negative effect of almost -1 percent. The
announcement of a 60 percent reserve requirement of US dollar positions for banks also
had a significant and negative, but smaller effect of -0.4 percent. Surprisingly, cumulative
abnormal returns, computed by aggregating the coefficients of all announcements, of the
policy announcements amounted to almost -1 percent if we exclude the ADR announcement
and equity removal announcement. Brazil noted that some investors were circumventing
the 2 percent IOF tax by going through the ADR market and thus put in place an ADR
tax, implemented about a month after the original IOF tax. As could be expected, the
ADR coefficient is positive–taxes on ADRs closed the window on ADR purchases and thus
re-triggered flows to Brazil. The coefficient is also approximately -1 percent and somewhat
neutralizes the cumulative impact of the IOF measures. In summary, the IOF had a lasting
impact on Brazilian asset prices as well, but one that was perhaps reversed given the tax
on the ADR market.
The control dummy for the entire control period did not yield a significant return,
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as well as the return from the interaction variable, which measures stock market inde-
pendence. Hence, we do not have evidence that changes in the Bovespa became more
independent of the regional markets with the implementation of the controls. We can also
not conclude that the controls cooled a supposed asset price bubble, as the control dummy
can measure. The abnormal returns for days following each announcement are also not
significant.
In Table 2.4, we run a similar analysis for the Chilean Santiago Stock Exchange. Not
only do we test the effects of Chilean currency intervention, but also the presence of
spillover effects from the Brazilian IOF tax. The first four variables are dummies for
announcement days, while the fifth variable is the dummy for the entire period of inter-
vention. The spillover effect can be quantified by the IOF Announcement dummy, which,
according to the table below, is significant and positive. However, the magnitude of the
effect is small and under 0.6 percent. The announcement of Chilean intervention had no
significant effects. Interestingly, the announcement of the end of the daily dollar purchases
had a significant and fairly large effect on stock prices, over 1 percent. The announcement
of increases in foreign investment limits also was significant, with a magnitude of almost
-1 percent. In contrast to Brazilian stock regression, we find evidence of increased stock
market independence, given by the coefficient of the interaction term of 0.29. Hence, dur-
ing the period of intervention the Santiago exchange and the regional stock index were less
correlated, but only by 0.01 percent. Nonetheless, we find no evidence that the period of
intervention had any effect of domestic stock prices. The announcements of both foreign
investment limits and the Brazilian IOF, however, did have significant effects. We conclude
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that our analysis gives evidence of spillover effects as well as significant but small effects
of intervention on asset prices and stock market independence.
Scale, Composition, and Spillover Effects of Capital Flows
The impact of the IOF on the scale and composition of inflows is also fairly consistent
with the literature. As in the other cases above we find small but temporary effects of
capital account regulations. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the effects on composition of net
capital inflows. Table 5 provides a more discerning decomposition of net inflows, and
more interesting results. In this table, while the announcements are not significant in the
OLS regressions, the first IOF announcement as well as the announcement of the reserve
requirement becomes significant in the IV regressions. Surprisingly, the effect of these
announcements is positive on short-term flows and negative on long-term flows—precisely
the opposite intended effect of policymakers. However, according to the dummy on all
announcements, the effect on short-term flows is negative, yet under 0.01 percent.
Contrastingly, Table 2.6 of total flows and flows decomposed into FDI and non-FDI
flows do not yield significant effects from the first IOF announcement. The all-announcement
dummy is positive and significant in the OLS regressions of total and FDI flows, yet loses
its significance with the instrument. Yet, not only are most of the variables insignificant,
but also very small in magnitude.
To complement the cross-sectional analysis, we create a panel of three Latin American
countries in order to obtain a better measure of the effect of the IOF on Brazilian flows in
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relation to neighboring EMEs. The other countries are Chile and Colombia. Preferably,
we would like to include a wider dataset; however, other Latin American EMEs have
substantially less developed markets and also do not have monthly data for capital flows
or GDP. Here, we do not include all other announcement dummies as they were not
significant. In the panel regression, the covariates except the forward exchange rates
are significant. The IOF announcement has positive and significant effects on total and
non-FDI inflows of 0.014 percent and 0.033 percent, respectively. The all-announcement
dummy, however, yields a positive, significant effect on FDI of 0.013 percent. Again, the
findings are somewhat puzzling. However, both in Brazil and in the larger literature there
is increasing concern that in the face of capital controls that investors ’disguise’ short-term
capital flows through financial FDI (Spiegel, 2012). There is even additional evidence that
the IOF increased intercompany bank loans which are categorized as FDI (Lambert et al.,
2011). The signs on our coefficients lend some credence to such claims, but cannot confirm
them. The results are depicted in Table 2.7.
Table 2.8 gives the potential spillover effects of Brazil’s controls on Chilean inflows.
Here we run a cross-sectional regression of the Chilean capital account. Since the results
did not report any significant coefficients beyond for the dummies of interest, we find no
evidence of spillover effects. One explanation is that we are testing broad categories of
capital flows rather than smaller components, such as bond and equity flows. Our more
aggregated variables then may not pick up the effects of the tax, yet specific components
may yield significant effects. Our results thus contrast a study which finds that the IOF
tax increased equity and bond inflows into other economies including Chile (Lambert et
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al., 2011).
2.6 Conclusion
In our paper we have examined the effects of attempts to navigate volatile capital in Brazil
and Chile. We find statistically significant impact of Brazilian controls. However, we would
characterize our findings as evidence of temporary ‘speed bumps’ that helped Brazil lean
against the wind rather than reversing the ‘tsunami’ of capital inflows that afflicted the
country during this period.
In Brazil, we find that the introduction of capital controls was associated with an
increase in total inflows but that the composition was shifted from short to longer-term
inflows. We also find that Brazil’s measures had a lasting impact on the level and volatil-
ity of the exchange rate. In terms of asset prices, only announcements of controls were
effective, and were offset by regulations on the ADR market that send investors back to
Brazil. We also find that Brazil’s measures modestly increased the ability of Brazil to pur-
sue an independent monetary policy. Chile’s currency interventions were less successful.
The announcement of currency intervention reduced the level of the exchange rate, but
not the volatility, and made the domestic stock market more independent from the region
as a whole. Chile’s interventions had no statistically significant impact on total inflows
of capital, the composition of inflows, or the ability of Chile to pursue an independent
monetary policy.
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More specifically, effects on the Brazilian exchange rate are similar: all announcements
have a statistically significant impact, with the first IOF announcement have the largest
negative effect, though small in magnitude. The overall effect of the controls is significant,
but small. In regards to asset prices, we find that the announcements of the IOF and
subsequent policy changes have statistically significant effects on the Bovespa. Particularly,
the cumulative impact of all announcements is negative, yet small. However, the overall
effect on the period during which the controls are in place is not significant.
In Brazil controls did have significant impact on total inflows as well as the composition
of flows, yet the effects are fairly small. The impact of announcements and overall impact
are significant, but again small. For Chile we find that Brazil’s cross-border financial
regulations did not increase capital inflows to Chile. Chile’s reserve accumulation measures
had only temporary effects in Chile and did not withstand the markets over time.
Our findings are consistent with the research on capital account regulations as reported
by Magud et al. (2011) and Ostry et al. (2010). From a policy perspective we can further
confirm that these measures can impact exchange rate appreciation and the development
of asset bubbles. However, it is not clear from our analysis that such measures should be
conduct alone but should rather be part of a wider package of macro-prudential policies.
From our analysis, capital controls alone will not be sufficient to address the concerns
about capital flow volatility unless they are much stronger and better enforced. Indeed,
our finding that the controls were associated with a shift toward FDI may lend credence to
claims that capital account regulations encourage some investors to circumvent regulation
by disguising short-term capital flows as FDI. Finally, our parallel analysis of Chile finds
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that intervening in currency markets can have an even weaker effect than capital flow
management measures and be costly in terms of their opportunity costs (Aizenman, 2010).
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Table 2.1: Brazilian Real
BRL
Mean Equation Variance Equation
IOF Announcement -0.0186∗∗∗
(0.000328)
ADR Announcement 0.00303∗∗∗
(0.000507)
IOF Increase 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.000537)
IOF Increase 0.00711∗∗∗
(0.000933)
Reserve Requirement 0.00622∗∗∗
(0.000519)
IOF Increase 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.000456)
IOF Modified -0.0160
(0.0107)
Tax on Derivatives -0.00508∗∗∗
(0.000583)
Controls Dummy -0.00144∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗
(0.000685) (0.192)
Domestic Interest Rate * Controls -0.232∗∗∗ 13.06
(0.0478) (8.451)
Domestic-Foreign Interest Rate Diff. -0.0589∗∗∗ 4.557∗
(0.0193) (2.632)
DXY -0.542∗∗∗ -35.63
(0.0584) (22.78)
GSCI 0.153∗∗∗ -24.65
(0.0236) (16.91)
EMBI -0.0644∗∗∗ 26.82∗∗∗
(0.0125) (5.849)
Constant 0.00127∗∗ -11.32∗∗∗
(0.000640) (0.466)
Observations 762
Wald 7.06e+10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.2: Chilean Peso
CLP
Mean Equation Variance Equation
IOF Announcement 0.00562∗∗∗ -1.281∗∗
(0.00147) (0.536)
Investment Limits Dummy 0.0137∗∗∗
(0.000458)
Intervention Announcement 0.00393∗∗∗ -217.2
(0.000402) (166.8)
Announcement Day+1 -0.0444∗∗∗
(0.000616)
Announcement Day+2 -0.0146∗∗∗
(0.000725)
Intervention Period Dummy -0.000125 -0.218
(0.000420) (0.161)
Domestic Interbank Interest Rate 0.000766 -0.712
(0.000566) (0.545)
Interest Rate * Intervention Dummy 0.000554 0.430
(0.000621) (1.866)
LIBOR -0.0436 -23.82
(0.0444) (17.67)
DXY -0.328∗∗∗ -19.06
(0.0473) (14.01)
GSCI 0.0715∗∗∗ -3.953
(0.0176) (5.622)
EMBI -0.0563∗∗∗ -1.330
(0.00897) (3.186)
Constant 0.000357 -10.45∗∗∗
(0.000239) (0.113)
Observations 844
Wald 7.81e+08
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Brazilian Stock Exchange
Bovespa
IOF Announcement -0.00321∗∗∗
(0.000784)
ADR Announcement 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.000535)
IOF Increase 0.00263∗∗∗
(0.000421)
IOF Increase 0.000718
(0.000817)
Reserve Requirement -0.00447∗∗∗
(0.000287)
IOF Increase 0.00115∗∗∗
(0.000291)
IOF Modified -0.00903∗∗∗
(0.000284)
Tax on Derivatives 0.00314∗∗∗
(0.000656)
Equity Tax Removal -0.00617∗∗∗
(0.000288)
Controls Dummy -0.000338
(0.000614)
MSCI EM Latin America 0.769∗∗∗
(0.0238)
MSCI*Controls 0.0227
(0.0332)
Constant 0.000197
(0.000547)
Observations 728
R2 0.828
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Chilean Stock Exchange
Santiago
IOF Announcement 0.00553∗∗∗
(0.000568)
Investment Limits Dummy -0.00971∗∗∗
(0.000486)
Intervention Announcement -0.000336
(0.000953)
Intervention Ended 0.0122∗∗∗
(0.000743)
Intervention Period Dummy -0.00110
(0.000680)
MSCI EM Latin America 0.303∗∗∗
(0.0156)
MSCI*Intervention 0.293∗∗∗
(0.0505)
Constant 0.000968∗∗∗
(0.000267)
Observations 816
R2 0.495
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Brazil Long-Term and Short-Term Net Inflows
Long-Term Long-Term(IV) Short-Term Short-Term(IV)
IOF Announcement -0.0415 -0.0450∗ 0.0317 0.0503∗
(0.0245) (0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0289)
IOF Increase -0.0262 -0.0304 0.0232 0.0305
(0.0222) (0.0248) (0.0195) (0.0289)
Reserve Requirement -0.0144 -0.0195 0.0273∗ 0.0315∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0157) (0.0130)
IOF Increase -0.0146 -0.0181 0.00620 0.0115
(0.0195) (0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0155)
Tax on Derivatives 0.0181 0.0151 -0.00338 -0.00634
(0.0141) (0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0179)
All Announcement Dummy 0.0250 0.0290 -0.00952 -0.0170∗
(0.0187) (0.0192) (0.0156) (0.00870)
Controls Dummy -0.000294 0.00287 -0.00355 -0.00573
(0.00829) (0.0100) (0.0123) (0.0239)
Lagged Long-Term -0.382∗ -0.213
(0.190) (0.551)
Current Account 0.357 0.647 -0.0937 -0.657
(0.467) (0.527) (0.889) (1.223)
VIX -0.286∗∗ -0.330∗∗ 0.148 0.235∗
(0.130) (0.126) (0.180) (0.120)
EMBI 0.0256 0.0344 -0.0262 -0.0412∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0224) (0.0279) (0.0156)
Carry Trade Index 0.0542 0.0726∗ -0.0242 -0.0651∗
(0.0378) (0.0418) (0.0544) (0.0336)
Forward Premium 0.0170 -1.331 2.169 4.614
(2.094) (3.203) (2.661) (3.796)
Domestic Interest Rate -0.203 -0.635 -0.438 0.466
(0.748) (0.855) (1.150) (0.609)
US Interest Rate 4.298 8.763 6.474 7.351
(12.02) (17.80) (17.39) (22.61)
Lagged Short-Term -0.290 -0.434
(0.269) (0.984)
Constant -0.0779 -0.124 0.180 0.238∗
(0.107) (0.149) (0.117) (0.129)
Observations 36 35 36 35
R2 0.627 0.677 0.495 0.641
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Brazil Total, Non-FDI, and FDI Net Inflows 
        Total Total(IV) Non-FDI Non-FDI(IV) FDI FDI(IV) 
IOF Announcement -0.0191 (0.0237) 
-0.0505 
(0.230) 
0.0200 
(0.0229) 
0.00360 
(0.235) 
-0.0262 
(0.0188) 
-0.0254 
(0.0259) 
IOF Increase -0.0321 (0.0324) 
-0.108 
(0.465) 
0.0239 
(0.0192) 
-0.00745 
(0.285) 
-0.0326 
(0.0196) 
-0.0339* 
(0.0193) 
Reserve 
Requirement 
0.00235 
(0.0167) 
-0.0226 
(0.161) 
0.0109 
(0.0221) 
0.0195 
(0.0464) 
-0.00558 
(0.0180) 
-0.0135 
(0.0303) 
IOF Increase -0.0142 (0.0179) 
-0.0287 
(0.101) 
0.0303 
(0.0228) 
0.0100 
(0.207) 
-0.0351* 
(0.0201) 
-0.0297 
(0.0295) 
Tax on Derivatives 0.00770 (0.0157) 
-0.00606 
(0.0865) 
0.0295* 
(0.0153) 
0.0153 
(0.110) 
-0.0155 
(0.0131) 
-0.0124 
(0.0149) 
All Announcement 
Dummy 
0.0198** 
(0.00907) 
0.0313 
(0.0937) 
-0.00776 
(0.0120) 
-0.00490 
(0.0757) 
0.0233 
(0.0156) 
0.0242 
(0.0164) 
Controls Dummy -0.0131 (0.0176) 
-0.0391 
(0.149) 
0.000125 
(0.0144) 
-0.0166 
(0.0102) 
-0.00464 
(0.00825) 
-0.00276 
(0.00803) 
Lagged Total Flows 0.324 (0.373) 
2.004 
(10.04)     
Current Account -0.195 (0.605) 
-1.353 
(4.961) 
0.109 
(0.813) 
-1.055 
(5.042) 
0.118 
(0.423) 
0.364 
(0.447) 
VIX -0.131 (0.0144) 
-0.122 
(0.276) 
0.142 
(0.221) 
0.113 
(0.945) 
-0.250** 
(0.117) 
-0.236 
(0.190) 
EMBI 0.0126 (0.0286) 
0.0469 
(0.237) 
-0.0331 
(0.0360) 
-0.0213 
(0.208) 
0.0334* 
(0.0179) 
0.0349 
(0.0222) 
Carry Trade Index 0.0444 (0.0504) 
0.0875 
(0.353) 
-0.0354 
(0.0631) 
-0.0434 
(0.224) 
0.0672* 
(0.0327) 
0.0779** 
(0.0344) 
Forward Premium -2.451 (3.396) 
-14.64 
(78.54) 
1.618 
(2.559) 
0.267 
(24.60) 
-1.113 
(1.663) 
-2.773 
(4.197) 
Domestic Interest 
Rate 
-0.748 
(0.957) 
-1.122 
(4.551) 
-0.575 
(1.217) 
0.299 
(1.419) 
-0.188 
(0.653) 
-0.595 
(0.692) 
US Interest Rate 13.02 (13.31) 
14.14 
(20.06) 
0.791 
(17.94) 
-9.109 
(67.81) 
14.47 
(10.11) 
18.56 
(15.03) 
Lagged Non-FDI 
Flows   
-0.204 
(0.233) 
0.567 
(6.460)   
Lagged FDI Flows     0.0154 (0.199) 
0.319 
(1.078) 
Constant -0.0544 (0.161) 
-0.452 
(2.471) 
0.269* 
(0.151) 
0.142 
(1.416) 
-0.206** 
(0.0889) 
-0.228** 
(0.0954) 
Observations 36 35 36 35 36 35 
R2 0.652 . 0.586 0.259 0.558 0.588 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 	
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Table 2.7: Brazil Total, Non-FDI, and FDI Net Inflows
Total Flows Non-FDI Flows FDI Flows
IOF Announcement 0.0272∗ 0.0487∗∗ -0.0215
(0.00756) (0.0109) (0.0185)
All Announcement Dummy 0.00935 -0.00803∗ 0.0174∗
(0.00671) (0.00187) (0.00483)
Controls Dummy 0.0317 0.0308 0.000860
(0.0162) (0.0137) (0.00427)
Current Account -1.251∗∗ -1.119∗∗ -0.132∗
(0.197) (0.232) (0.0358)
Domestic-US Interest Rate Diff. -0.0855 -0.140 0.0542
(0.143) (0.387) (0.345)
Constant 0.0695 0.0160 0.0535
(0.0981) (0.0676) (0.0433)
Observations 111 111 111
R2 0.458 0.405 0.346
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Chile Net Inflows and Spillover Effects
Total Flows Non-FDI Flows FDI Flows
IOF Announcement 0.0274 0.0234 0.00664
(0.181) (0.220) (0.0847)
Brazil Controls -0.0579 -0.0629 0.0118
(0.0604) (0.0890) (0.0535)
Chile Intervention Dummy 0.00719 -0.00673 0.00520
(0.142) (0.181) (0.0925)
Lagged Total Flows -0.290∗∗∗
(0.101)
Current Account -1.223∗ -1.333 0.117
(0.704) (0.862) (0.512)
VIX 0.515 -0.204 0.550
(1.044) (1.362) (0.598)
EMBI 0.0321 0.0849 -0.0629
(0.0821) (0.0916) (0.0470)
Carry Trade Index -0.335 1.014 -0.810
(7.893) (9.149) (3.143)
Forward Exchange Rate 8.368 1.550 2.122
(49.37) (57.58) (20.06)
Domestic Interest Rate -0.519 -1.703 1.355
(2.239) (2.103) (1.349)
US Interest Rate 36.44 121.2 -71.62
(195.0) (230.2) (70.51)
Lagged Non-FDI Flows -0.171
(0.141)
Lagged FDI Flows -0.326
(0.198)
Constant -1.432 -1.795 0.729
(1.099) (1.263) (0.668)
Observations 36 36 36
R2 0.246 0.206 0.224
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Tariffs and Wage Inequality in the
Late Nineteenth Century United
States
3.1 Introduction
The late nineteenth century United States can hardly be called a bastion of free trade.
During the Civil War high tariffs were imposed on most manufactured goods as a means
of paying off government debt incurred during the war. Tariff levels were reduced slightly
in the early 1870s, but subsequently rose back to the immediate post-wartime levels by
the late 1880s. With the imposition of the McKinley Tariff in 1890, protectionism reached
close to a historical high in the U.S.
The post-bellum era can also be characterized by a flattening of relatively high levels
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of wage inequality (Williamson and Lindert 1980). The exact timing of changes in wage
inequality earlier in the nineteenth century remains an issue of dispute among economic
historians, as will be outlined below. Yet, there seems to be a consensus that skill differ-
entials at the turn of the twentieth century were perhaps slightly higher than thirty years
earlier. Social and political historians argue that wage gaps at that time had become a
source of friction, contributing to labor unrest and influencing the rise of third parties such
as the Populists and the Progressive movement (Reitano 1994; Goldin and Katz 2008).
Previous work on the sources of wage inequality in the nineteenth century United
States has focused heavily on capital accumulation and technological factors. Accord-
ing to Williamson and Lindert (1980), as the economy became more industrialized and
technologies more capital intensive, the demand for skilled labor grew more quickly than
supply, causing skilled wages to rise relative to unskilled wages. Williamson and Lindert
date the initial increase in inequality to the period between 1820 and 1860, but other
scholars have challenged the idea of a widespread antebellum surge in wage inequality or
the notion that capital and skilled labor were relative complements in manufacturing tech-
nology (Grosse 1982; Margo and Villaflor 1987; Wright 1990; Goldin and Katz 1998). On
the other hand, there is agreement that foreign immigration in the late nineteenth swelled
the supply of unskilled labor, putting downward pressure on unskilled wages (Williamson
1974; Williamson and Lindert 1980; Goldin and Katz 2008).
Missing from virtually all studies of late nineteenth century wage inequality is the
role played by high tariffs. Did such tariffs exacerbate or mitigate wage gaps at that
time? I approach the analysis of the impact of tariffs on wage inequality through the use
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of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Such models have been widely used
by economic historians and trade economists to study the impact of trade policies on a
variety of economic outcomes, including inequality (Pope 1971; Williamson 1974; Burstein
and Vogel 2010; Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 2010). An especially relevant example
is Pope (1971), who used a CGE model to examine the impact of antebellum tariffs on
factor incomes. My framework is similar to Pope’s, but modified and calibrated to fit
the characteristics of the post-bellum economy. A key feature of the open economy is the
modeling of two tariffs on manufactures: one on cotton textiles and the other on all other
manufactured goods. This distinction is important; cotton was not only an intermediate
input in the production of cotton textiles, but also a primary U.S. export.
My basic finding is that, had the United States established completely free trade rather
than protective tariffs, wage inequality as measured by the skilled-unskilled wage differ-
ential would have been higher in the late nineteenth century. In this regard, my result
is reminiscent of modern studies that have similarly shown that free trade can raise in-
equality, whether measured by a skill premium or by a full wage distribution (Burstein
and Vogel 2010; Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 2010). The “completely” qualification is
important: I also find that selective removal of the cotton textile tariff would have also
increased the skilled-unskilled premium, whereas maintaining the textile tariff while elim-
inating the second tariff would have lowered the premium. Overall, however, the desire
to protect late nineteenth century manufacturing from foreign competition seems to have
prevented wage inequality from reaching ever higher levels in the late nineteenth century.
In this sense, increased protectionism may have slowed the rate at which inequality was
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rising over the course of the nineteenth century, and thus, may have been an important
factor contributing to the relative plateau in wage inequality, as emphasized by Williamson
and Lindert (1980).
3.2 U.S. Trade Policies in the Late Nineteenth Century
Figure 1 summarizes the historical timeline of tariffs and average tariff rates in the United
States from 1821 to the beginning of the twentieth century. Beginning with the Morrill
Tariff of 1861, tariffs were raised repeatedly to fund the Union war effort and to pay
off war debts after the war ended. Revenue accrual and debt payoff was so successful
that by the early 1880s, the U.S. had a large fiscal surplus. Democrats and Republicans
debated the optimal response to the surplus, with tariff policy at its center. In general,
Democrats opted for tariff reductions to reduce fiscal revenue and hence the surplus, as
well as to promote fairness by easing tax burdens. On the other hand, Republicans were
against tariff reduction, which they rationalized would hurt domestic competition and
lower wages. In 1882, a Tariff Commission was formed to study the policy issues in order
to make recommendations.
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Figure C.1. Tariff Rates and Wage Inequality, 1821-1909
Sources: Taussig (1931); Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (1975, p. 888);
Williamson and Lindert (1980, p. 307). Average tariff rates are computed from the ratio of duties to total imports
of all dutiable items. The skilled-unskilled wage ratio is the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers’ wage rates in
manufacturing and building trades from a spliced series of daily and weekly wage rates.
Alongside the tariff debate was growing labor dissent and an escalating concern over
changes in the wealth distribution. The U.S. was becoming an “increasingly polarized
economy” due to widening income gaps between different classes of workers (Reitano 1994,
p. 63). Moreover, the 1880s marked a decade of strikes and boycotts leading to the
formation of labor organizations such as the Knights of Labor and the Socialist Labor
Party. According to Reitano (1994, p. 68), during this time the “issue of equitable
distribution of wealth repeatedly surfaced as the primary concern on both sides of the
aisle” in Congress. In sum, fiscal surplus, ongoing worker unrest and a changing income
distribution all characterized the late 1800s and thus were important factors influencing
tariff reform.
Trade debate fully ignited after President Grover Cleveland’s annual report to Congress
in 1887, which fueled the Great Tariff Debate of 1888 (Taussig 1931). Cleveland’s fervent
defense of the Democrats’ free trade ideology drew a line in the sand between the two
political parties. The Republican platform of higher duties aimed to protect the manufac-
118
turing industry, especially textiles, and to raise wages of both factory workers and farmers.
Republicans acknowledged that greater protection might increase wealth inequality (per-
haps by raising the return to capital in domestic manufacturing), but did not view this as
an adverse outcome necessarily (Reitano 1994, p. 74). By contrast, Democrats believed
tariffs would adversely impact the working class by raising the cost of living; free trade,
therefore, would promote a more equitable distribution of economic welfare.
Consistent with their party platform, Democrats in the House of Representatives in-
troduced the Mills Bill in 1888, which aimed at reducing tariff duties. To the Democrats’
dismay, however, the Republicans captured both houses and won the presidential election
of 1888, leading to the passage of the McKinley Tariff in 1890. The tariff act raised tar-
iff rates to unprecedented U.S. levels since the 1820s. For example, as shown in Figure
1, tariff rates reached an average of 50 percent in 1894 compared to the low to mid-40
percent range in the 1880s. Intending to protect the manufacturing sector, the McKinley
tariff especially targeted domestic manufacturing, raising duties on imported goods such as
wool, cotton textiles, linens as well as metals, foods, and other manufactured goods. The
controversially high protection without a doubt contributed to the imminent defeat of the
Republicans in both houses and in the presidential election of 1892. Democratic control
of Congress allowed for the passage of the Tariff Act of 1894, but which left tariff rates
largely unchanged except for the removal of wool and slight reductions on other items.
Yet just a few years later, the Republicans regained both houses and the presidency in the
election of 1896. As could be expected, the Dingley Tariff was passed in 1897, restoring
the duties on wool, raising duties on most items and some to 1890 levels, while reducing
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only a few. The last decade of the 1800s was unquestionably a decade of persistently high
tariff rates.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the post-bellum protec-
tive tariff policy on wage inequality. Accordingly, Figure 1 above provides an overview of
the trends in skilled wage ratios together with average tariff rates from 1821 to 1909. Prior
to my time period of interest—the late nineteenth century—the degree of trade protection
and of wage inequality appear to be inversely related. Then, beginning in the 1870s the
rising path of the skilled wage premium was notably flattened, proceeding the sharp in-
creases in tariff rates during and after the Civil War. Important questions to resolve are
then: Did the historically high levels of trade protection of the late nineteenth century
contribute to the plateau in the skill premium? If so, what is the relationship between
tariffs and inequality and how can it be quantified? Before I introduce my model and
analysis, it is useful to describe the previous literature and findings related to this topic.
3.3 Literature Review
Since the 1970s wage inequality has risen sharply in the United Sates. Over the same
period, the world economy has become more integrated as many countries, including the
U.S., have liberalized their trade policies. These concurrent trends have prompted numer-
ous studies of the impact of trade liberalization on inequality, which I will review below. By
contrast, economic historians have studied the history of American inequality and of trade
policy, but very few previous studies attempt to link the two historically, and virtually
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none have for the post-bellum period when tariff rates were at a historical peak.
Williamson and Lindert (1980) is a standard source of the history of American inequal-
ity from the colonial period to about 1970. The authors conceptualize their study in terms
of the “Kuznets” curve—the idea that inequality first rises and then falls over the course
of economic development, thereby following an inverted-U shape pattern. According to
Williamson and Lindert’s chronology, inequality rose sharply from 1820 to 1860—signify-
ing the rising portion of the American Kuznets curve. From 1860 to the 1920s, inequality
continued on an upward trend, but at a much attenuated pace. The downward portion
began in the 1930 and continued through the 1940s before reaching another plateau mid-
century. Since their book was published in 1980, Williamson and Lindert do not analyze
the more recent increase in wage inequality.
Williamson and Lindert adopt a multi-sector CGE model to explain changes in inequal-
ity which they proxy by the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. The primary exogenous
factors in their model are technological change and the accumulation of capital and skills.
A key assumption is that capital and skilled labor are relative complements in manufac-
turing. Whenever conditions favored capital accumulation relative to labor, the model
dictates that the relative demand for skilled labor will increase. According to Williamson
and Lindert, the model does well in accounting for the rising portion of the American
Kuznets curve—that is, the course of the skill premium before the Civil War. However,
the post-bellum period “requires a more eclectic explanation,” especially in the 1880s
(Williamson and Lindert 1980, p. 287).
Economic historians have challenged the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of
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Williamson and Lindert’s conclusions. Further analysis of the timing by Grosse (1982)
and additional archival evidence on wages introduced by Margo (2000) suggests that skill
differentials between artisans and common labor did not increase before the Civil War,
although Margo suggests that the relative wage of white-collar workers did increase from
1820 to 1860. Goldin and Katz (1998; see also Atack, Bateman and Margo 2004) argue
that capital and skilled labor were substitutes, not complements, prior to the diffusion of
electricity, while Goldin and Katz (2008) claim that wage differences between skilled and
unskilled labor began to narrow around 1900, earlier than Williamson and Lindert’s dating.
However, none of these critiques have challenged the general idea that skilled-unskilled
wage ratios were, by historical standards, relatively high in the late nineteenth century,
nor have any addressed possible connections between trade policy and wage inequality
during that era.
Modern theory and empirical analysis have shown wage inequality increases with trade
openness. In the U.S. and other countries in the late twentieth century, international trade
is found to have effects on income distribution similar to those of skill-biased technical
change, which shifts production (unskilled) labor within or between industries (Feenstra
and Hanson 2001; Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2002; Burstein and Vogel 2010; see
also Yeaple 2005 and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 2010 who consider the full distri-
bution of wages). Trade thereby raises the relative demand and wages of nonproduction
(skilled) labor and, thus, the skill premium. Feenstra and Hanson (2001) demonstrate
that, during the more recent period of 1979-1995, increased trade in intermediate inputs
have exacerbated skilled-unskilled wage differences—a finding of potential relevance to my
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study because of the significant role of U.S. cotton, an intermediate input, in international
trade in the nineteenth century.
Ever since Taussig (1931)’s classic study on tariff policies, economic historians have
been interested in the impact of trade policy on U.S. economic development, both in
general and for specific industries such as cotton textiles (see Bils 1984; Irwin 1988; Irwin
and Temin 2001; Irwin 2002). However, with partial exception, historical studies have
generally ignored how trade policy in the past has impacted inequality.
The partial exception is Pope (1971), who analyzes the impact of the U.S. antebel-
lum tariff on income distribution between geographic regions and sectors.1 Similar to the
McKinley Tariff, the antebellum tariff was a source of regional and political disunity and
precipitated the nullification crisis of 1832. The belief at the time was that the tariff hurt
the Southern economy by transferring income from the South to the North. Drawing on
conventional trade theory (for example, Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson-Metzler
theories), the tariff should benefit the scarce factor (used more intensively for the imported
good) and hurt the abundant factor (used more intensively for the exported good), im-
plying protection for the scarce factor. Pope constructs a CGE model to evaluate these
predictions and finds that the results are highly sensitive to parameter values. He does
not, however, directly address whether the tariff affected skilled-unskilled wage differences;
rather, his focus is on factor incomes and regional differences.
Although Pope’s specific results are of limited relevance for the present study, his
1Griffin and Margo (1997) use time series analysis to examine the relationship between tariff levels and
the North-South wage gap. Griffin and Margo argue that free trade (lower tariffs) promoted North-South
wage convergence. Although this result is suggestive of a link between tariffs and inequality, Griffin and
Margo do not pursue any link in their paper nor does their time series analysis reveal the precise economic
mechanisms that would have been at play; hence their study is of limited direct relevance to my own.
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general approach can be usefully adapted to the task at hand. The model presented in
the next section has strong similarities to Pope’s, especially in the emphasis on cotton
as an intermediate input. It departs from Pope, however, by drawing on Williamson and
Lindert’s emphasis on the skill premium. By marrying the two models of Pope’s and
Williamson and Lindert’s, it is possible to examine the impact of the post-bellum tariffs
on inequality. Following Bils (1984), Irwin and Temin (2001) and others, I examine free
trade counterfactuals—that is, a zero tariff equilibrium—as a means of assessing the role
of protective trade policy. The model is sufficiently complex to permit both positive and
negative overall effects of free trade on wage differentials; hence, the result cannot be
easily predicted, but will depend on the model’s calibration to appropriate late nineteenth
century parameters and endowments.
3.4 Model
This section presents my CGE model of the late nineteenth century U.S. economy. Similar
to previous studies, the model is multi-sectoral and assumes perfect competition.
The economy is divided into four sectors: food (f), cotton (c), cotton textiles (t)
and all other manufactures (m). The agriculture sector is assumed to be located in the
Midwest and West; the manufacturing sector, the Northeast; and the cotton sector, the
South. The representative agent consumes three final goods: food, cotton textiles, and
manufactured goods other than cotton textiles. Raw cotton is an intermediate input used
in the production of cotton textiles. Food is the non-traded good, while the two main
124
U.S. imports are cotton textiles and all other manufactured goods and the main U.S.
export is raw cotton. The factors of production are improved land, physical capital, and
heterogeneous labor. Improved land, which is immobile across sectors, is divided between
land for agricultural crop production and land for raw cotton production. Physical capital,
also immobile, is used in the two manufacturing sectors. Non-production, or skilled, labor
is mobile between the two manufacturing sectors only, while production, or unskilled, labor
is mobile across all sectors.
Model Setup
With the assumption of full employment, the following full employment conditions must
hold:
affXf = Yf (3.1)
accXc = Yc (3.2)
aktXt = Yk (3.3)
akmXm = Yk′ (3.4)
astXt + asmXm = Ys (3.5)
aufXf + aucXc + autXt + aumXm = Yu
Here, Yf , Yc, Yk, Yk′ , Ys and Yu denote the factor supplies: improved land used in food
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crop production, improved land used in cotton production, physical capital and skilled
labor used in cotton textile and all other manufacturing industries, and unskilled labor,
respectively. All factor supplies are assumed to be fixed such that the model conducts
short-run analysis. Xi denotes output in sector i and aij are unit factor requirements,
defined as the units of input i required to produce one unit of output j. The above
equations can be combined into two equations in terms of factor supplies and unit factor
requirements:
auf
aff
Yf +
auc
acc
Yc +
aut
akt
Yk +
aum
akm
Yk′ = Yu (3.6)
ast
akt
Yk +
asm
akm
Yk′ = Ys (3.7)
Given perfectly competitive markets, the following zero-profit conditions must hold:
accRc + aucWu = Pc (3.8)
affRf + aufWu = Pf (3.9)
aktRk + autWu + astWs + actPc = Pt(1 + τt) (3.10)
akmRk′ + aumWu + asmWs + afmPf = Pm(1 + τm) (3.11)
where Rc, Rf , Rk and Rk′ are rental rates, and W u and W s are unskilled and skilled
wages. The small country assumption does not hold in this model; thus, world prices, P j ,
in each sector j are not fixed.
To incorporate tariff policy, let τt be the advalorem tariff rate on cotton textiles, and
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τm be the advalorem tariff on other manufactures. Factor coefficient act is defined as the
units of cotton required to produce one unit of cotton manufactures and is fixed. The
coefficient afm is fixed, but other factor coefficients, aij , are variable.
Demand in the three consumption sectors are as follows:
Df = AfP
−ff
f [Pm(1 + τm)]
fm [Pt(1 + τt)]
ftIfi (3.12)
Dt = At[Pt(1 + τ)]
−tt [Pm(1 + τ)]tmP
tf
f I
ti , (3.13)
Dm = Am[Pm(1 + τm)]
−mm [Pt(1 + τt)]ftP
mf
f I
mi , (3.14)
where
Df = Xf ,
Dt = Xt + St, (3.15)
Dm = Xm + Sm, (3.16)
and
Dc = actXt + actX
∗
t (3.17)
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where
Dc = Xc.
Here, Aj are demand shifters in sectors f , t, and m, and total U.S. real income is
given by I. Markets clear such that total demand equals total supply. Note that Dc is
a derived demand and depends on both domestic and foreign textile production, (X∗m),
since raw cotton is the exported good. Since manufactured products are a traded good,
demand equals domestic plus foreign supplies, Sj .
Factor incomes can be expressed in terms of the consumer price index, P j , and real
income, Ij , of factor j:
P cIc = RcYc (3.18)
P fIf = RfYf (3.19)
P kIk = RkYk (3.20)
P k
′
Ik′ = Rk′Yk′ (3.21)
P sIs = WsYs (3.22)
P uIu = WuYu (3.23)
Before the system can be solved, the following equations must be specified. Foreign
supply, St, is further decomposed and expressed as the difference of textile production,
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X∗t , and textile consumption, D∗t , in the foreign country:
St = X
∗
t −D∗t (3.24)
Assuming zero international capital flows, the condition for trade balance, in which the
value of U.S. cotton exports equates the value of foreign manufacturing imports, must
hold:
P cactX
∗
t = PmSm + PtSt (3.25)
Foreign textile production is assumed to be a linear function of textile and cotton world
prices:
X∗t = (1/b)Pt − (1/b)actPc (3.26)
Foreign textile consumption, like domestic consumption, assumes log-linear demand:
D∗t = A∗tP
−βtt
t P
βtm
m P
∗βtf
f I
∗βti (3.27)
where A∗ is a foreign demand shifter and I∗ is total foreign income. Note that the foreign
price of food, P ∗f differs from the domestic price, P f (since food is the non-traded good)
and is fixed. Total U.S. real income is the sum of factor incomes and tariff revenue,
assuming revenue is distributed to consumers in lump-sum,
I = Ic + If + Ik + Ik′ + Is + Iu + τtPtSt + τmPmSm (3.28)
while foreign income is given simply in terms of the change in price of cotton (or the price
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of U.S. exports),2
M I∗ = − M Pc(actX∗t ) (3.29)
The remainder of the model transforms the previous equations and variables in terms
of their rates of change, denoted by ∧.3
With λuj denoting the proportion of unskilled labor in sector j , λsj denoting the
proportion of skilled labor, and assuming factor supplies are fixed, equation (6) can be
expressed as:
λuf Rˆf + λucRˆc + λutRˆk + λumRˆk′ = Wˆu (3.30)
λstRˆk + λsmRˆk′ = Wˆs (3.31)
Letting θij denote the share of factor i income in sector j income, the zero-profit
conditions (8) - (11) can be rewritten as:
θccRˆc + θucWˆu = Pˆc (3.32)
θff Rˆf + θufWˆu = Pˆf (3.33)
θktRˆk + θutWˆu + θstWˆs + θctPˆc = Pˆt + Tˆt (3.34)
2This simplifying assumption is also used in Pope (1971).
3The remaining reduced system of equations are expressed in rates of changes, following the Ronald
Jones (1963) algebraic approach. Analysis in terms of rates of change has advantages, especially since
the rates of change of factor incomes is the main objective of the model (Pope 1971). Deriving short-run
unit cost and zero-profit functions and then totally differentiating the reduced system of equations is a
common method and is further explained in Feenstra and Hanson (2001)’s empirical survey of trade and
wage inequality models.
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θkmRˆk′ + θutWˆu + θsmWˆs + θfmPˆf = Pˆm + Tˆm (3.35)
where (34) and (35) is evaluated at τj = 0, and where Tj = 1 + τj .
Totally differentiating the demand functions for food, cotton textiles, and other man-
ufactures, (12) - (14), and the derived demand equation for cotton, (17), yields:
Dˆf = −ff Pˆf + ftPˆt + ftTˆt + fmPˆm + fmTˆm + fiIˆ (3.36)
Dˆt = −ttPˆt − ttTˆt + tmPˆm + tmTˆm + tf Pˆf + tiIˆ (3.37)
Dˆm = −mmPˆm − mmTˆm + mtPˆt + mtTˆt + mf Pˆf + miIˆ (3.38)
Dˆc = ρcXˆt + ρ
∗
cXˆ
∗
t (3.39)
where ρc is the proportion of cotton consumed in the U.S., ρ
∗
c is the proportion consumed
by foreign textile producers, and ij are price elasticities of demand. All demand shifters
Aj are assumed to be constant.
Real factor incomes, (18) - (23), expressed in rates of change are:
Iˆc = Rˆc − αf Pˆf − αtPˆt − αtTˆt − αmPˆm − αmTˆm (3.40)
Iˆf = Rˆf − αf Pˆf − αtPˆt − αtTˆt − αmPˆm − αmTˆm (3.41)
Iˆk = Rˆk − αf Pˆf − αtPˆt − αtTˆt − αmPˆm − αmTˆm (3.42)
Iˆk′ = Rˆk′ − αf Pˆf − αtPˆt − αtTˆt − αmPˆm − αmTˆm (3.43)
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Iˆs = Wˆs − αf Pˆf − αtPˆt − αtTˆt − αmPˆm − αmTˆm (3.44)
Iˆu = Wˆu − αf Pˆf − αtPˆt − αtTˆt − αmPˆm − αmTˆm (3.45)
where αf , αt and αm are budget shares for food , textiles, and other manufactured goods.
4
By assumption, Yˆj = 0.
As in Pope (1971), production of cotton, food, and textiles is constant returns to scale
(CRS). Hence, the elasticity of substitution in each production function is equal to unity.
Using this assumption and the formula for the elasticity of substitution for each good j,
σj =
aˆuj−aˆjj
Rˆj−Wˆu , the full employment conditions (1) - (4) become:
Xˆc = θuc(Rˆc − Wˆu) (3.46)
Xˆf = θuf (Rˆf − Wˆu) (3.47)
Xˆt =
θut
θut + θkt
(Rˆk − Wˆu) (3.48)
Xˆm =
θum
θum + θkm
(Rˆk′ − Wˆu) (3.49)
The demand equations for textiles, (15), and for other manufactures, (16), expressed
in rates of change are:
Dˆt = ρtXˆt + ρ
∗
t Sˆt (3.50)
Dˆm = ρmXˆm + ρ
∗
mSˆm (3.51)
4The price indexes of all j factor owners can be approximated as P j = P
αf
f (PtTt)
αt(PmTm)
αmsince
there are three final goods in the economy and the marginal propensity to consume each good is equal
across all factor owners.
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where ρj is the proportion of final good j (consumed in the U.S.) that are produced in the
U.S. and the ρ∗j is the proportion that is imported to the U.S.
Similarly, the equation for textile imports, (24), expressed in rates of change is:
Sˆt =
1
1− δ Xˆ
∗
t −
δ
1− δ Dˆ
∗
t (3.52)
where δ is the proportion of textiles produced in the foreign country that are consumed
abroad, i.e.
D∗t
X∗t
.
The trade balance condition, (25), is simply:
Pˆc + Xˆ
∗
t = γt (Pˆt + Sˆt) + γm (Pˆm + Sˆm) (3.53)
where act is fixed.
Define η as the supply elasticity of cotton textiles in the foreign country. The equations
for foreign production, (26), and consumption, (27), of textiles and other manufactures
are now:
Xˆ∗t = ηPˆt − ηθctPˆc (3.54)
Dˆ∗t = −βttPˆt + βmtPˆm + βtiIˆ∗ (3.55)
since Pˆ ∗f = 0 by assumption.
Finally, the rate of change of domestic and foreign real incomes, (28) and (29), are
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given as:
Iˆ = ξcIˆc+ξf Iˆf +ξkIˆk+ξk′ Iˆk′+ξsIˆs+ξuIˆu+ξτt (τˆt+ Pˆt+ Sˆt)+ξτm (τˆm+ Pˆm+ Sˆm) (3.56)
Iˆ∗ = −µPˆc (3.57)
where ξj is the share of factor j real income in total U.S. real income, ξτ is the share of
tariff revenue (generated by imports) in total U.S. real income, and µ is the share of U.S.
cotton exports in total foreign income.
With these equations, the system can now be simplified. Equations (46) - (57) can
be substituted into equations (30) - (45). Using the market clearing conditions, Xc = Dc
and Xf = Df , along with the full employment conditions, (46) - (49), the following
variables can be eliminated: Xc, Xf , Xt, Xm, Dc, Df , Dt, Dm, St, Sm, X
∗
t , S
∗
m and
D∗t . The final 16 equations are all in terms of the 16 variables of interest: six rental rates
(Rc, Rf , Rk, Rk′ , Ws, Wu), six factor incomes (Ic, If , Ik, Ik′ , Is, Iu), and four commodity
prices (Pc, Pf , Pt, Pm). Thus, with 16 equations and 16 unknowns, a solution is obtained
using a linear solver in Matlab. In particular, the relative changes in skilled and unskilled
labor incomes, Is and Iu, respectively, can then be determined.
3.5 Parameter Estimation
The model’s system has a total of 57 parameters that must be appropriately calibrated to
accurately fit the late nineteenth century economy. In addition, there are 16 parameter
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constraints. The constraints are given in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1. Parameter Constraints
(1) λuc + λuf + λut + λum = 1 (9) ρc + ρ
∗
c = 1
(2) λst + λsm = 1 (10) ρt + ρ
∗
t = 1
(3) θcc + θuc = 1 (11) ρm + ρ
∗
m = 1
(4) θff + θuf = 1 (12) γt + γm = 1
(5) θkt + θst + θut + θct = 1 (13) αf fI + αttI + αmmI = 1
(6) θkm + θsm + θum + θfm = 1 (14) αttt − αmmt − αf ft = 0
(7) αf + αt + αm = 1 (15) αmmm − αttm − αf fm = 0
(8) ξc + ξf + ξk + ξk′ + ξs + ξu + ξτt + ξτm = 1 (16) αf ff − αttf − αmmf = 0
Some parameters of the model are directly observed. These observed, or structural,
parameters include the unskilled and skilled labor shares, λuj and λsj , income shares, θij ,
ξj , µ, budget shares, αj , and consumption shares, δ, γj and ρj . Such parameters can be
calibrated using historical data, the specific goal being to reflect accurately certain key
features of the distribution of factors–for example, the concentration of unskilled labor in
agriculture and capital in manufacturing.
Since my aim is to assess the impact of late nineteenth century tariffs, it makes sense to
use the Census of 1890 to estimate structural parameters. In particular, the 1890 Census
was much more informative than its predecessors in measuring the skill composition of
the workforce, especially in manufacturing. The information is sufficient, for example, to
distinguish clerks, skilled, and unskilled operatives, unlike previous censuses. In addition
to the census, I also make use of Williamson (1974) and Williamson and Lindert (1980)
to calibrate the model.5 Trade parameters can be estimated from the 1890 Census and
5Additionally, other data sources consulted are Copeland (1966), Shaw (1947) and Trends in the
American Economy in the Nineteenth Century (1960, vol. 24).
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1893 Census Statistical Abstract, except the parameter, δ, which is taken from British
historical estimates (Floud and McCloskey 1981, p. 52). The reader should note that the
shares must be scaled to account for missing factors and sectors.
The unobserved parameters are the behavioral elasticities ij , βij , and η. As a practical
matter these must be assumed, but prior studies and introspection give some guidance.
For example, the food elasticities can be assumed to be fairly low and close to zero, as also
assumed in Pope (1971). Domestic income elasticities are taken from Williamson and Lin-
dert (1980), while the foreign income elasticity is approximated by country estimates given
in Houthakker (1975). The textile and manufacturing demand elasticities are estimated
from Pope (1971) and Gavin Wright’s estimates from Wright (1971). Unfortunately, data
on most of these elasticities, such as the cross elasticities, are insufficient. Nonetheless, the
demand elasticities are subject to the above constraints, reducing the degrees of freedom.
Constraint (13) can be derived by differentiating the economy-wide budget constraint with
respect to income, while constraints (14) - (16) are derived by differentiating the budget
constraint with respect to respective prices.
In Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below, all parameter estimates are listed.
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Table 3.2. Structural Parameters
Parameter Definition Estimate
Unskilled Labor Shares
λuc Share of unskilled labor in cotton sector 0.08
λuf Share of unskilled labor in food sector 0.57
λut Share of unskilled labor in cotton textiles sector 0.02
λum Share of unskilled labor in other manufacturing sector 0.33
Skilled Labor Shares
λst Share of skilled labor in cotton textiles sector 0.01
λsm Share of skilled labor in other manufacturing sector 0.99
Income Shares
θcc Share of cotton input income in cotton sector 0.22
θuc Share of unskilled labor income in cotton sector 0.78
θff Share of food input income in food sector 0.30
θuf Share of unskilled labor income in food sector 0.70
θst Share of skilled labor income in cotton textiles sector 0.02
θut Share of unskilled labor income in cotton textiles sector 0.24
θct Share of cotton input income in cotton textiles sector 0.44
θkt Share of capital income in cotton textiles sector 0.30
θsm Share of skilled labor income in other manufacturing sector 0.05
θum Share of unskilled labor income in other manufacturing sector 0.3
θfm Share of food input income in other manufacturing sector 0.25
θkm Share of capital income in other manufacturing sector 0.4
ξc Proportion of cotton income in U.S. GNP 0.037
ξf Proportion of food income in U.S. GNP 0.226
ξk Proportion of capital income in cotton textiles in U.S. GNP 0.041
ξk′ Proportion of cotton income in other manu. in U.S. GNP 0.220
ξs Proportion of skilled labor income in U.S. GNP 0.044
ξu Proportion of unskilled labor income in U.S. GNP 0.406
ξτt Proportion of cotton textile tariff revenue in U.S. GNP 0.005
ξτm Proportion of other manufacturing tariff revenue in U.S. GNP 0.013
µ Proportion of the value of U.S. cotton exports in U.S. GNP 0.014
Budget Shares
αf Share of food in total expenditure 0.5
αt Share of cotton textiles in total expenditure 0.1
αm Share of other manufactures in total expenditure 0.4
Source: See Section 5 of paper.
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Table 3.3. Trade Parameters
δ Proportion of foreign cotton textile production that is consumed abroad 0.25
γt Value of cotton textile imports as a proportion of total imports 0.1
γm Value of other manufactured imports as a proportion of total imports 0.9
ρc Proportion of raw cotton consumed by domestic producers 0.3
ρ∗c Proportion of raw cotton consumed by foreign producers 0.7
ρt Proportion of cotton textile consumption produced domestically 0.3
ρ∗t Proportion of cotton textile consumption that is imported 0.7
ρm Proportion of other manufactures consumption produced domestically 0.8
ρ∗m Proportion of other manufactures consumption that is imported 0.2
Source: See Section 5.
Table 3.4. Policy Parameters
Tariff Policy Decrease of 45% to 0% ad valorem rate
τˆt Rate of change of ad valorem tariff rate on cotton textile imports -1.0%
Tˆt ˆ1 + τt -0.31
ˆτm Rate of change of ad valorem tariff rate on other manufacture imports -1.0
Tˆm ˆ1 + τm -0.31
Source: 1893 U.S. Census Statistical Abstract, p. 31.
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Table 3.5. Behavioral Parameters
Parameter Definition Estimate
Demand Elasticities
ff Price elasticity of food 0.00
tf Cotton textile price elasticity of food 0.20
mf Other manufactured good price elasticity of food 0.10
tt Price elasticity of cotton textiles 1.50
ft Food price elasticity of cotton textiles 0.07
mt Other manufactured good price elasticity of cotton textiles 0.25
mm Price elasticity of other manufactures 0.75
fm Food price elasticity of other manufactures 0.25
tm Cotton textile price of other manufactures 1
Income Elasticities
fi Income elasticity of food 0.68
ti Income elasticity of cotton textiles 1.21
mi Income elasticity of other manufactures 1.35
Foreign Elasticities
βtt Price elasticity of cotton textiles 1
βmt Manufactured good price elasticity of cotton textiles 1
βti Income elasticity of cotton textiles 1.3
η Supply elasticity of foreign cotton textiles 1
Source: See Section 5.
3.6 Results
The ad valorem tariff rates are specified to match the average rate during the late 1880s and
early 1890s, or approximately 45 percent. I study the impact of free trade by setting tariff
rates to zero, and then re-computing the equilibrium. Because there are two tariff rates
in the model, I conduct three experiments: setting both tariffs to zero (policy 1); setting
the cotton tariff to zero while keeping the manufacturing tariff fixed at its historical level
(policy 2); and setting the manufacturing tariff to zero while the cotton textile tariff is kept
fixed (policy 3). The variables of interest are the changes in skilled and unskilled income,
Iˆs and Iˆu, respectively, and ulimately, the skilled income premium, Sˆ. Since the rate of
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change in the skilled income premium is the difference between the changes in skilled and
unskilled income, income inequality is measured by the change in this premium, computed
as Sˆ = Iˆs − Iˆu. Because my primary interest is inequality, I report the changes in the
model outcomes that are relevant, e.g. the skill premium, rather than the full equilibrium.
The results, shown in Table 3.6, are plausible a priori. For example, I find relatively
little absolute effect of tariff removal on the unskilled wage, which is reasonable given that
unskilled labor is mobile across all sectors. The effects on skilled labor are larger because
its mobility is restricted compared with unskilled labor.
Table 3.6. Changes in the Skill Premium and Factor Incomes
Log Changes
Policy Variable Complete Tariff Removal Cotton Textile Tariff Tariff on Other Manufactures
τˆt -1 -1 0
τˆm -1 0 -1
Factor Income
Sˆ 0.042 0.125 -0.083
Iˆs 0.048 0.121 -0.074
Iˆu 0.005 -0.004 0.009
Iˆc 0.134 0.103 0.031
Iˆf -0.029 -0.087 0.058
Iˆk -0.286 -0.187 -0.1
Iˆk′ 0.051 0.124 -0.073
Exports 0.192 0.037 0.156
The first column of results shows the impact of setting both tariff rates to zero, i.e.
completely free trade in the context of the model. Free trade leads to a rise in the skill
premium, a finding similar to more recent studies. In the free trade equilibrium the returns
to skilled and unskilled labor both rise, but the increase in the former is larger so that the
skill premium rises by 4.2 percent. Interestingly, I also find that the return to land used
in cotton production also largely increases, absolutely and relative to the unskilled wage,
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whereas land used in food production sees its price decline. The increase in cotton land
income, Ic, can be explained as follows. Raw cotton, the export good, is land-intensive
while imported textiles and manufactures are capital-intensive. By the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem, free trade raised the relative price of the export good—cotton—which in turn
raises the return to land used in its production. Thus, the finding implies that tariffs hurt
the welfare of farmers in the South.
While a movement to completely free trade results in a rise in the skill premium, the
size of the increase is relatively modest. However, much larger effects in absolute value
occur if one or the other tariff is kept at its historical level while the other is reduced
to zero. Consider, for example, a policy change that reduces the tariff on manufactured
goods other than cotton textiles, leaving the cotton tariff at its historical level. Such a
reduction clearly lowers the demand for labor in manufacturing by reducing the domestic
price of manufactures. Demand for skilled labor is hit harder, however, than unskilled labor
because while the former can move to the textile sector, unskilled labor is mobile across
all sectors. By contrast, keeping the manufacturing tariff fixed while reducing the cotton
textile tariff to zero has more complex effects that, in the end, raise the skill premium by
as much as 12.5 percent.
Consider a tariff on cotton textiles only. In lowering the import tariff, the domestic
price of import substitutes is lowered. Domestic production is no longer as profitable
so there is a shift of production away from the cotton textiles industry. The Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem predicts production to shift to export goods and affect factor demands
in that sector; however, in this model production can also shift to an additional sector of
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manufacturing. Since skilled labor is mobile across the two manufacturing sectors, skilled
workers can migrate from cotton textiles to the other manufacturing sector. Unskilled
labor also migrates, but is mobile across all sectors. This shift of labor decreases the
marginal product to capital in cotton textiles, increases marginal product of capital in
other manufactures, and increases the return to land in the cotton sector. The results in
Table 4 exactly show this: real income to cotton land increases, real income to capital in
cotton textiles decreases, and real income to capital in other manufactures increases.
As a mobile factor, unskilled labor income is trivially affected (an increase of 0.5
percent) while skilled labor income is dramatically raised. In my model, skilled labor
is the scarce factor. By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the scarce factor should be hurt
since it is used intensively in imports, yielding the opposite result. One explanation is that
the shift of production away from cotton manufactures to other manufactures raises the
relative demand of skilled labor in other manufactures. The shift of skilled labor out of
cotton textiles would also raise its return in that industry. Hence, it is very plausible that
real income of skilled labor is raised substantially due to a removal of the cotton textile
tariff.
With the removal of both tariffs or of only the cotton textile tariff, the price of the non-
traded good price fell. According to the findings presented in Feenstra and Hanson (2001),
the prices of non-trade goods that used unskilled labor intensively had the greatest impact
on the unskilled wage. Specifically, a reduction in the price of the non-trade good lowered
the real unskilled wage. Such a mechanism can explain the negative, although small,
effect on unskilled labor income since the non-traded good, agricultural food products,
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uses unskilled labor intensively in this model. Additionally, the fall in the price of food
explains the reduction, in real income to farmers concentrated in the West.
In general the direction of change is robust to variations in parameters values. For
example, I conducted a number of perturbations in the equilibrium that altered the demand
elasticities in manufacturing; if the elasticities are larger in absolute value, the effects on
the skill premium are larger. However, the qualitative finding about the impact of tariffs
on inequality remains the same. For example, in Table 3.7, lower the price elasticity of
cotton textiles from 1.5 to 0.5 does not induce any directional changes. Increasing the
food elasticities also does not change the signs of the impact on labor incomes, as shown in
Table 3.8. The changes are much larger; however, such large values for food elasticities is
unreasonable. Lastly, in Table 3.9, slightly altering these elasticities does induce directional
change since the impact on the skill premium is now of opposite sign (when only one tariff
is removed). Under complete removal, however, the skill premium still increases. Thus,
the impact on inequality is fairly robust to change in parameter estimates, while this is
not the case for other factor incomes.
Table 3.7. Changes in the Skill Premium, tt = 0.5
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Log Changes
Policy Variable Complete Tariff Removal Cotton Textile Tariff Tariff on Other Manufactures
τˆt -1 -1 0
τˆm -1 0 -1
Factor Income
Sˆ 0.035 0.112 -0.077
Iˆs 0.044 0.115 -0.070
Iˆu 0.009 0.003 0.006
Iˆc 0.057 -0.046 0.103
Iˆf -0.004 -0.040 0.035
Iˆk -0.468 -0.538 0.070
Iˆk′ 0.049 0.121 -0.072
Table 3.8. Changes in the Skill Premium,ff = 1,tf = 1,mf = 1
Log Changes
Policy Variable Complete Tariff Removal Cotton Textile Tariff Tariff on Other Manufactures
τˆt -1 -1 0
τˆm -1 0 -1
Factor Income
Sˆ 0.078 0.283 -0.208
Iˆs 0.079 0.265 -0.186
Iˆu 0.004 -0.018 0.022
Iˆc 0.205 0.590 -0.385
Iˆf -0.059 -0.275 0.216
Iˆk -0.295 0.203 -0.499
Iˆk′ 0.083 0.265 -0.183
Table 3.9. Changes in the Skill Premium,ff = 0.5,tf = 1.1,mf = 0.35
Log Changes
Policy Variable Complete Tariff Removal Cotton Textile Tariff Tariff on Other Manufactures
τˆt -1 -1 0
τˆm -1 0 -1
Factor Income
Sˆ 0.008 -0.006 0.014
Iˆs 0.022 0.018 0.004
Iˆu 0.014 0.024 -0.010
Iˆc -0.073 -0.607 0.534
Iˆf 0.041 0.158 -0.116
Iˆk -0.671 -1.412 0.742
Iˆk′ 0.029 0.032 0.004
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Finally, the results have a conflicting component due to the tariff on other manufac-
tures. When the tariff on other manufactured goods is removed, inequality is reduced by
-8.3 percent. Yet, combined with the other tariff, the effect is offset so that the inequality
between manufacturing workers is raised by 4.2 percent. The export sector most certainly
is playing a role since cotton is not only the primary export, but is in intermediate good
in the cotton manufacturing sector. In his model, Pope had similar conflicting results for
capital income changes. For example, raising the tariff on other manufactures increased
capital income in that sector, while imposition of the cotton textile tariff either increased
or decreased the income. Since changes in capital income are linked to changes in labor
incomes, the effect on capital income plays a relevant role and its sensitivity to parameter
values may be contributing to the obscure effect on relative skilled labor incomes.
3.7 Conclusion
Protective tariffs were the norm in the late nineteenth century United States. This paper
considers whether such tariffs exacerbated or mitigated wage inequality at that time. Pre-
vious work has examined factors affecting inequality in the late nineteenth United States,
but not tariff policy. Modern studies have shown that free trade has generally produced
rising wage inequality in recent decades. My paper considers whether a similar dynamic
was in play in the late nineteenth century.
Using a computable general equilibrium model calibrated to fit the parameters of the
late nineteenth century economy, I, like modern studies, find that tariffs were a miti-
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gating factor. This finding is important because most of the other factors examined in
previous work–for example, immigration or skill-biased technical change–tended to exac-
erbate inequality. Had the United States circa 1890, say, suddenly adopted a free trade
policy–political unlikely but certainly economically feasible–the skilled-unskilled wage dif-
ferential would have been higher although quantitatively the effects are not large in the
aggregate. Although stylized, my model is complex enough to suggest other interesting
effects of tariff policy at the time–for example, a removal of tariffs would have arguably
helped cotton farmers, and selective removal of tariffs would have had different effects from
wholesale elimination.
Although my model is sufficient to answer the basic question posed of it regarding
inequality, various refinements could yield additional interesting implications. For exam-
ple, factor supplies are exogenous in my model whereas, in reality, they are endogenous.
The export sector could be expanded to include certain types of manufactured goods, as
certainly was the case historically; similarly, further insights into how tariffs affected wage
inequality might be gleaned by allowing for a services or financial sector that is intensive
in the use of skilled labor. Pertaining to the framework, the CGE model utilizing Jones
algebra also may exaggerate the impacts on factor incomes; CES, Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
may provide more reliable results. My tests of complete tariff removal may be a bit ex-
treme, since tariffs during this period never reach low levels; studying the counterfactual
of smaller decreases in tariff rates may be more useful to consider. Finally, the parameter
estimates that I rely on are little more than educated guesses. Yet, that said, it seems
unlikely that various refinements to the model would alter my basic conclusion. In the
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absence of protective tariffs, inequality in the late nineteenth century, already very high
by historical standards, would have been worse.
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